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 4 
Summary 
The Nuremberg Charter introduced corporate criminal liability into 
international law and the great American Chief Prosecutor Justice Robert 
Jackson gave a promise that any legal person who commits crimes prescribed 
by international law shall be prosecuted and punished according to 
international criminal law. However, during this period of time, a corporation 
was never prosecuted per se as the sitting judges did not seem to have the will 
to dwell on the establishment of the elements of crime that needed to be 
satisfied in order to impute criminal liability on a corporate body. Later, the 
same promise was reflected upon during the preparatory works of the Rome 
Statute; there existed a will to prosecute legal entities “with the exception of 
States, when the crimes were committed on behalf of such legal persons or 
by their agents or representatives.” Unfortunately, the time restraints of the 
preparatory works resulted in no inclusion of legal entities as subjects of ICC 
and international criminal law. Thus, it remained only a notion that has been 
developed and exercised in domestic practices. 
 
As corporate criminal liability developed domestically and as time has 
changed, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon decided to take up a case 
concerning corporate criminal liability and prosecute a corporate body, which 
constitutes a landmark case in which a corporation has been brought before 
an international tribunal and had international corporate criminal liability 
imputed on it. Notably, as no guidance could be found in international law, 
the Court turned to domestic practices in order to seek clarification on how to 
best asses a case of such notion. The mere act of taking up such a case and 
turning to domestic practices is a clear indication that international corporate 
criminal liability is well needed in the international domain of criminal law 
and that domestic practices are highly influencing it. The Tribunal was very 
brave in its decision to widen its scope of jurisdiction to include legal entities 
and, therefore, serves as a source of encouragement to the ICC and other 
tribunals lacking such power. 
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Markedly, the ICC lacks jurisdiction over legal entities as aforementioned. 
However, a recent case indicates that change might be at hand; a case in which 
corporations have been complicit to crimes against humanity lays before the 
Court. However, as the ruling in the case is not accessible, the assessment of 
the ICC remains unclear and only speculations may be drawn upon. Likewise, 
if the ICC decides to widen its scope to include corporate entities as it was 
aimed to be during the preparatory work, a provision setting out possible 
sanctions is lacking and not much guidance can be found in the case law of 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon as the cases of this Court are not of same 
gravity. In order to go about these problems in depth, the author will first 
present how domestic practices have affected international criminal law with 
regards to currently existing forms of liability, how they are going about the 
notion of corporate criminal liability and how it influences the international 
level. After presenting this initial analysis, the author will draw attention to 
how the ICC may best assess the case before it and proposes an Article with 
sentencing measures which may be used if a corporate body is found guilty. 
Because, “if corporations are persons under the law, then they should be more 
fully so.” 
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Preface 
The author has always been of the opinion that corporate bodies should be 
held liable for major wrongdoings especially if the crimes committed are of 
high concern such as crimes against humanity and genocide. However, as she 
began her law studies, she realised that there is no such thing as corporate 
criminal liability in the international domain of criminal law which caused 
her to enlighten herself on the topic in order to understand the underlying 
reasons for it. Through the course of enlightenment, the author discovered 
that there has always been a will to prosecute corporations internationally but 
that inconvenient circumstances restrained the development of the notion. She 
then began to wonder if there has been an interest to prosecute corporate 
entities internationally, how come it has never occurred considering various 
possibilities of such a novelty? Therefore, the author found that using the 
prism of corporate crimes to establish international prosecution of those 
corporations that thirst for power and self-enrichment to the cost of innocent 
lives has ever been an interest of investigation of hers and to give rise to her 
personal view on the topic. 
 
This thesis symbolises an outcome of many people who influenced the author 
divergently. The author sees herself as a mere observer who found virtuosity 
to document what was well contemplated by highly respected minds. For 
these reasons, the author would like to express her high gratitude. Firstly, the 
author wants to express her appreciation to the Swedish Faculty of Law at 
Lund University for giving her the opportunity to study law and finalise her 
studies with a Masters’ in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at the Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Secondly, the 
author finds her colleagues and professors, namely, Brian Burdekin, Karol 
Nowak, Radu Mares and Henrik Norinder, of high value as they have 
challenged her, inspired her with ideas and given their support during various 
occasions; she is highly thankful for having them intriguing her life and is 
looking forward to spending many years together with them as mentors and 
work companions.  
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Moreover, without her internship on a specific case, dealing with international 
corporate criminal liability for the first time in history, at the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, she might not have been as intensely interested in the topic as 
that occasion made her realise the mere importance and need of such liability 
in international criminal law. Thus, the author regards highly Michael 
Mansfield QC who inspired, supported and pushed her to apply to an 
international tribunal. Without his faith in her, she would not have been where 
she is today. Moreover, the author would like to express her gratitude to the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon for accepting her application of becoming an 
intern at the Court and admires highly the Defense Council that admitted her 
to be a member of his team in the case of Al Jadeed, STL-14-05.  
 
Without the lasting support of her family and friends, who the author 
heartwarmingly values, she would not have been able to write her thesis. They 
believed in her abilities to become a lawyer more than anyone could ever wish 
for. Therefore, the author finds it convenient to mention them by name: 
Magdalena, Jasmina, Dinko, Mithun, Behrouz, Elvis, Maria, Davit, Marco, 
Sanjin, Nikola, Emelie, Kjell, Nena, Britt, Kamal, David, Bobo, Dave, 
Chafic, Anand, Joshua and her dear Grace. The author especially wants to 
thank her mother Azra who thought her about the value of knowledge and 
pleasures that come with it. Without her endless love and high encouragement 
to achieve all her goals, the author would not have had the possibility to 
achieve what she calls success. However, the greatest success that the author 
is in possession of is her family. Therefore, the author esteems her 
grandmother Beba, grandfather Said, uncle Armin, aunt Amira, cousins Azra 
and Alen, and other family members, namely Nail, Zemira and Jela, that 
supported her together with her mother. The author feels endlessly privileged 
to have them in her life. 
 
Those above mentioned are to be endorsed for many joys that the author has 
experienced since the start of her studies at the Faculty of Law in Lund. 
However, her deepest appreciation is granted to her supervisor Professor 
Göran Melander who never for a moment doubted her academic abilities and 
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was the main source of inspiration causing her academic development. The 
author finds herself honoured to have a supervisor who cared about her as a 
student and her work in progress. He was actively devoted in responding to 
her questions and was in every way more than thoughtful. Göran Melander is 
a true source of kindness and inspiration, exalting the author to achieve a 
greater good in the name of human rights. 
 
Thank you. 
 
Armina Savanovic 
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Abbreviations 
ATCA United States Alien Tort Claims Act 
AUC   Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
EC  European Commission 
ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia 
EG   European Governments 
EU    European Union 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICC Statute; Rome Statute Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
ICCPR  International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
ICTR Statute Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia 
ICTY Statute Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
JCE Joint Criminal Enterprise 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
PMSC Private Military and Security 
Companies 
PSC  Private Security Service Providers 
RGC Royal Government of Cambodia 
SCSL  Special Court for Sierra Leone 
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STL   Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
STL Statute Statute of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 
UN United Nations 
WWII Second World War 
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Definitions 
International Humanitarian Law consists of essential rules applicable in 
armed conflicts. These duties involve endorsement of legislation and penal 
sanctions to prevent grave breaches of humanitarian law. A clear example is 
the Geneva Conventions and their two protocols. Similar duties exist in the 
Rome Statute. 
 
International crimes or universal crimes with universal jurisdiction are 
particularly grave offences of concern to the world, having their foundation 
in domestic and international law. They may occur during war or as part of a 
larger aggressive conduct by authoritative actors within a society. These types 
of serious crimes are often labelled as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and the crime of aggression (also known as atrocity crimes), high-
jacking etc in humanitarian treaties and statutes of international criminal 
tribunals. 
 
Human rights are universal rights as every person has and should enjoy them 
and are ruled mainly by international human rights law. International 
human rights law consists of international human rights treaties and other 
instruments adopted since 1945. This set of rules are implemented on national 
level and lay down obligations which States are bound to respect.  
 
Criminal Law consists of utilitarian rules, designated by state institutions, 
followed by legal consequences such as solemn punishment depending on the 
classification of the unlawful conduct. Furthermore, it encompasses the more 
general principles for attributing criminal liability, as well as proportionality 
and concrete practices related to sentencing that have to be taken into account 
before a criminal act can be fairly translated into a particular sanction against 
the perpetrator.  
 
International Criminal Law is an established part of public international 
law facilitating international prosecution of culprits. International criminal 
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law encompasses regulations on responsibility for crimes under international 
law. Norms regulating ‘responsibility’ would seem to correspond to 
international law in a substantive sense, leaving out or placing less emphasis 
on procedural, jurisdictional, and institutional rules.  
 
Grave crimes or universal crimes are certain identifiable acts that constitute 
grave breaches of rules of conduct, authorised or tolerated by leading powers, 
are punishable and require prosecution through fair trials. This definition is 
based on the linking of grave breaches of rules of conduct to powerful state 
or organisational actors in a society. While human right crimes may serve as 
standard threats to human dignity, universal crimes may be perceived to 
compose extreme threats to both people and societies. 
 
A corporation or corporate body is a  legal person/entity created by or under 
the authority of the laws of a state. Moreover, it may constitute of a single 
person and his or her heirs or be an association of individuals subsisting as a 
body with a persona and acts as a unit or single individual in matters 
concerning the common purpose of the association. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Problem Formulation 
Corporations are entities consisting of individuals making decisions on behalf 
of the company. Moreover, individuals operating as a criminal enterprise, as 
an entity, can be held liable for crimes committed by the group. Thus, it is 
feasible to stress that individuals operating as a group should be held liable if 
they commit crimes while commencing their work as an organisation.1 
Notwithstanding, it can be argued that international treaties do not explicitly 
provide for corporate criminal liability; however, the European Governments 
and UN perceive the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 as applying to 
corporate entities, which makes it possible to hold corporations liable for 
human rights abuses.3 Additionally, the Genocide Convention4 may be 
interpreted as including corporate entities; Article 4 of the Genocide 
Convention does not distinguish natural persons from judicial persons.5 The 
same lack of clarification of what the term person refers to can be found in 
the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals. Contrastingly, the Rome Statute leaves 
out uncertainty through an explicit definition of person in its Article 25 by 
stating that it refers to natural persons only. 
 
The notion of corporate criminal liability was first touched upon at 
Nuremberg during the trials of German war criminals after WWII. However, 
only individual corporate officers were prosecuted for crimes such as 
                                                
1 Clapham, A., ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors’, 88 International Review of 
the Red Cross (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), p. 61. (Clapham, 2006) 
2 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 
217A (III), (UDHR). 
3 Ibid, at 228. 
4 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277. 
5 Kelly, M.J., ‘The Status of Corporations in the Travaux Preparatoires of the Genocide 
Convention: The Search for Personhood’, 43 Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law (2010), p. 484 (Kelly 2010); Black, H. C., Black’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 1933).  
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genocide6 despite the provision in the Nuremberg Charter7 that is allowing 
for the prosecution of a group or organisation. Some examples of this are the 
cases of Flick and Krupp in which the directors of the companies were 
prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity whilst the 
corporations per se were never put on trial. This is seemingly ironic in the 
view of the author as this same Court constantly referred to corporate criminal 
liability while prosecuting these individuals.8 The Court held the corporation 
liable9 but restrained itself in its Rule. Moreover and as an example, it was 
held in the case of Krupp that it was the corporation per se acting in violation 
of international law through its employees and that it had the required mens 
rea for the crimes committed.10 Despite clear arguments and provisions 
prohibiting corporations from commencing illicit human rights violations, 
very little has been done to prevent and punish them from continuing with 
their commence.11  
 
To repeat, corporate criminal liability has been touched upon already during 
the trials of war criminals but has never been assessed as the concept it is nor 
has it ever been imputed on a corporation on the international level before the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) intrepidly decided to widen its scope to 
include Corporate entities. Arguably, one of the reasons why other 
international courts and tribunals have not followed the STL, is the legal 
principle of societas delinquere non potest that prevailed at the time of the 
creation of the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals’ Statutes. This principle 
essentially urges that corporations lack capacity and that crimes are 
considered to be natural facts. In other words, corporations cannot commit 
crimes as acts are of natural nature and can, therefore, not be bearers of blame, 
                                                
6 Bush, J.A., ’The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: 
What Nuremberg Really Said’, 109 Columbia Law Review (2009), 1105–1111. 
7 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement 
for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis 
("London Agreement"), 8 August 1945. 
8 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), pp. 315-316. 
9 Ibid., p. 316. 
10 Ibid., p. 315-316. 
11 Kelly 2010, p. 490. 
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which is the criminal judgement.12 Moreover, as corporations lack capacity, 
they also lack independent free will, which is a requirement for the 
establishment of liability in international criminal law.13 Apparently, this 
principle has its origins in methodological individualism claiming that only 
individuals can be subjected to criminal law, a notion that is recognised by 
international courts and tribunals. 
 
Contrastingly, ICC’s first Chief-Prosecutor held that corporations should be 
subjected to prosecution internationally;14 captivatingly, the preparatory 
works stated that prosecution of legal entities should be enabled.15 Because 
“[a]t no point during the drafting of the Rome Statute was it claimed by any 
delegation that the ‘legal person’ referred to in the draft could not demonstrate 
the requisite legal capacity to be bearers of international obligations.”16 Alas, 
the actual reason why the Rome Statute does not contain a provision on 
corporate criminal liability today is because of the time limit to create the 
statute and not because of the lack of will among the international actors who 
played a significant role in the preparatory works.17 While renowned 
researcher argued that no international tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes 
commenced by corporations,18 the author wants to stress that international 
courts and tribunals do have jurisdiction which will be shown through the 
examination of one case from the STL and one currently pending case before 
the ICC. As, “if corporations are persons under the law, then they should be 
more fully so”19; because, with rights come responsibility. 
 
Moreover, corporate criminal liability has been thoroughly established in 
domestic law systems mainly through reference to the notion of vicarious 
                                                
12 Fieberg, G., ’National Developments in Germany: An Overview.’ in A. Eser, G. Heine and 
B. Huber (eds), Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, (Freiburg im 
Breisgau: Ed. Iuscrim, 1999), pp. 86. 
13 Ibid., p. 86. 
14 Podgers, J., ’Corporations in the Line of Fire’, A.B.A. Journal (2004). 
15 Clapham, (2006), p. 30. 
16 Ibid., p. 31. 
17 Ibid., p. 31. 
18 Kelly 2010, p. 490. 
19 Ibid., p. 490, emphasis added. 
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liability and the theory of identification, also titled as the theory of alter ego. 
However, state practices with regards to the solicitation of the theories are 
divergent; conversely, similarities exist within the application of both. 
Vicarious liability always requires satisfaction of the element of knowledge 
regardless if the crimes commenced were executed by the directing mind, the 
employees or other affiliates of the legal entity. Remarkably, liability can only 
be imputed on the directing mind if the offender or offenders have acted with 
authorization and within the scope of his, her or their employment and in the 
name of the legal body.20 Notwithstanding, this form of liability is not 
preferred as it aims at punishing a physical person, much alike command 
liability. In differentiation, the theory of alter ego makes an analogous 
interpretation of natural person in criminal law in order to explain the notion 
of what a legal person is. Accordingly, it can be compared to JCE where 
persons involved constitute the brains and limbs for the function of the entity 
as such. In other words, the theory of alter ego aims at prosecuting the 
corporate body per se21 for the crimes committed by the persons acting in the 
name of the corporation.22 
 
Notwithstanding, if the domestic level has affected international criminal law 
to develop international command liability that leads to JCE liability, 
domestic practices on corporate criminal liability will have a similar impact 
on the international domain of criminal law, which will be shown throughout 
the thesis. Furthermore, interesting is to see how corporate entities have been 
punished as a result of imputed corporate criminal liability. As it is somewhat 
clear, international corporate criminal liability does not exist and if it does, it 
is not addressed properly, which might serve as an indication that corporate 
crimes are acceptable. However, if corporate crimes are blameworthy 
                                                
20 Ferguson, G., ’The Basis for Criminal Responsibility of Collective Entities in Canada’ in 
A. Eser, G. Heine and B. Huber (eds.), Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective 
Entities, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Ed. Iuscrim, 1999), pp. 163 
21 Ledeman, E., ’Models for imposing corporate criminal liability: From adaption and 
imitation toward aggregation and the search for self-identity’, 4 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 
(2000), 641-708, pp. 693. 
22 Dubber, M. and Hörnle, T., Criminal Law, A Comparative Approach, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p. 334. 
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internationally, there exists no legal framework on the international level that 
can rightfully prosecute corporate bodies for atrocity crimes. 
 
1.2 Aim and Research Question 
The aim of the thesis is to show how domestic practices affect international 
criminal law and that there is room for corporate criminal liability on the 
international level. As the author finds it not enough to just show on the 
potential developments she also aims to go a step further and provide the 
international domain with possible sentencing measurements in the event that 
the ICC takes up a case considering corporate criminal liability. In other 
words, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the legal situation, as in position, 
and suggest possible constructive solutions on how to best develop 
international criminal law without it risking undermining its core. Moreover, 
the author wants to open up for discussions and possible solutions to the 
overall academic debate.  
 
In order to satisfy the aim of the thesis, this work will dwell on the following 
research question: Is there room for international corporate criminal liability 
in international criminal law?, which will be answered through examination 
of three underlying questions; (1) How has domestic law affected 
international criminal law?, (2) To what extent can corporations be held 
liable internationally?, (3) If a corporation brought before an international 
court or tribunal is prosecuted for complicity of some sort, what are the 
feasible measures that can be taken against them and why? 
 
1.3 Methodology and Structure 
In the pursuit of answers to the posed questions, the current thesis is delimited 
to corporate criminal liability in domestic practices. Moreover, as the thesis 
will explore what implications domestic practices have on international 
criminal law, relevant case law on corporate criminal liability in the 
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international domain will be surveyed. Apart from that and in the attempt to 
prove that there is room for corporate criminal liability in international 
criminal law, an argumentative explanation of how command responsibility 
and JCE liability serve as a basis for further development of international 
criminal law, which is indeed pertinent to the research problem that the author 
is presenting.  
 
The author attempts to provide an answer to the research question through the 
application of the positivistic approach as the author aims at investigating the 
legal situation through observation and objective interpretation of the 
collected data. Correspondingly, the author endeavours to provide an accurate 
understanding of the current position of international criminal law with 
regards to corporate criminal liability. Certainly, this is a form of evaluative 
research. Thus, international criminal law will be subjected to appraisal in the 
wake of domestic practices on the topic that is subject to this thesis. To this 
end, the domestic practices that are considered are the ones exercising 
corporate criminal liability with reference to the Rome Statute. In lieu of the 
above mentioned, this methodological strategy enables the author to explore 
and venture to explain the significance of corporate criminal liability on the 
domestic level that affects the international domain of criminal law, the need 
to expand the jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals to enhance 
this form of liability and to see where international criminal law is lacking to 
hence be able to propose suggestions with constructive solutions to the 
problematics. In effect, the empirical research observes domestic practices 
and its enshrinement regarding corporate criminal liability that influences the 
international domain of criminal law. Likewise, the author has availed herself 
of the opinion of renowned scholars on the topic to validate her arguments; 
however, some theoretical contemplations from a human rights perspective 
are discussed as well. 
 
Overall, the thesis is determined by its aim and the applicability of corporate 
criminal liability in international criminal law. Therefore, the author begins 
with a swift discussion on how domestic practices have affected international 
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criminal law in the creation of currently existing forms of liability in chapter 
two. Further on, the author continues with delimitating the notion of corporate 
liability and its importance in domestic law in chapter three, though a rather 
theoretical approach is presented in order to facilitate the understanding of 
the reasoning in domestic practices. This is done by way of identification of 
two leading theories together with the author’s reasoning why she believes 
the one suffices more than the other in the best interest of achieving justice. 
 
Chapter four deals specifically with corporate complicity liability and the 
application of the Rome Statute in domestic practices and continues with an 
exploration of a recent case on the same matter. The domestic practices serve 
as explanatory examples on how cases dealing with corporate complicity 
regarding grave crimes should be assessed. Furthermore, international 
instruments on state practices concerning the notion of corporate liability are 
used as means to validate the argument how domestic practices affect the 
international domain of criminal law and how these cases might be assessed.  
 
As the author moves forward, she introduces the notion of international 
legislation, decisions and doctrine as sources of international criminal law in 
chapter five. Herein, the author sheds light on the novelty of the STL’s 
attempted international prosecution of corporations for the first time in 
history. Accordingly, the one case of concern is depicted together with the 
reasoning of the of the Court when assessing the case and its sentencing 
judgement. As it might be interpreted that the jurisprudence of the STL lays 
the foundation of the essence of this thesis, it becomes highly relevant with 
regards to the chapters that follow. Accordingly, the author discusses the 
implications that this decision had on the international domain and thus 
present a problem concerning the application and calculation of the 
sentencing measures imposed on the legal person. The author’s criticism 
addressed to the Court is based on the human rights perspective for the greater 
good to grant the victims justice. The author avails herself to this approach in 
order to evaluate to what extent justice may be achieved and how the 
corporate culprit might be punished as corporate power, in the global 
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economy, needs to be balanced to justice. Additionally, a pending case before 
the ICC is discussed together with possible outcomes that the author assumes 
will be at hand. Furthermore, this chapter serves as basis for clarification why 
the international courts and ad hoc tribunals lack jurisdiction over legal 
entities and how it can be developed to include corporate criminal liability. 
As the author has noted, explicit prohibitions on corporate behaviour are 
lacking in international criminal law despite encouragement to have it 
included in the Rome Statute during its preparatory works; because of this, 
sentencing measures are lacking as well. Thus, the author has been dedicated 
to include the creation of an Article providing possible sentencing measures 
in the attempt to have it possibly incorporated in the statutes of international 
courts and tribunals for the realisation of justice. 
 
By way of conclusion, the author will sum up all the suppositions that she has 
drawn through the writing of this thesis by reference to all three questions that 
served as assistance to answer the research question together with other 
general comments on the topic in chapter six. The chapter is concluded with 
a concise answer to the research question regarding the scope of international 
criminal law and if there is room for corporate criminal liability in it. 
 
1.4 Material 
The materials used consist of mainly treaties and regulations in international 
humanitarian law, soft law instruments, draft codes, the statutes of ICC, 
ICTR, ICTY, STL, the Nuremberg Charter, human rights instruments such as 
the ICCPR and ICESCR, case law from the Courts above, Tokyo Tribunal, 
SCSL, ECCC and domestic practices. The works of renowned scholars and 
advocates have also been referred to. 
 21 
2 Currently Existing Forms of Liability in 
International Criminal Law: A 
Background Check 
2.1 Command Responsibility 
The tenet of command responsibility originated in the year 1474 and the trial 
of Peter von Hagenbach, an international case in which 28 judges from the 
Hol Roman Empire held Peter von Hagenbach guilty for failing to prevent 
crimes that he as a knight, or commander, had the duty to prevent.23 Despite 
the notion of command liability, the case is not considered being a case of 
command responsibility as it is today in international law. As international 
law has not been a subject of scholarship before the 16th Century,24  the 
binding power of the will of nations was not considered until the 17th 
Century.25 Thus, the actual development on this domain was limited to the 
national level.26 The first recognised notion of command responsibility on the 
international level can be found in Article 1 of the Regulations annexed to the 
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907,27 asserting that states are obliged to be 
held responsible for the delinquencies of state actors in times of war.28 In 
contrast, there was nothing indicating the existence of criminal liability for 
failure to prevent or repress the delinquencies of the underlings. This was first 
established after the WWII during the trials of war criminals; command 
criminal liability for failure to prevent and punish was neither existing in the 
                                                
23 Parks, Cf. W., ’Command Responsibility for War Crimes’, 62 Military Law Review 
(1973), pp. 1, 4-5. 
24 Brierly, J., The Law of Nations (6th edn., by Humphrey Waldock, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1963), p. 25. 
25 Neff, S., ’A Short History of International Law’, in M. Evans (ed.), International Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 31, 37 (citing Hugo Grotius, The Law and 
Peace (translated by F. Kelsey, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1925), p. 44). 
26 Parks, ibid., pp. 5-10.  
27 International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
28 The term someone is to be read as State; the State was to be held liable for the acts of its 
forces in war. 
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Nuremberg Charter nor was it acknowledged at the Nuremberg Tribunal, but 
was perceived in judicial decisions.29  
 
Even though command criminal liability was not explicitly provided for in 
the Nuremberg Charter, it was discussed during the trials of war criminals. 
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter did not explicitly address modes of 
liability but did address the culpability of leaders executing a common plan 
to commit crimes, including responsibility for any person acting as co-
perpetrator.30 Article II(2) of the Control Council Law No. 10 stressed that 
anyone in lead of or participating in an organisation or group carrying out 
crimes was to be held criminally responsible for the crimes of his or hers 
underlings.31 Explicit command responsibility was not referred to in the 
provision but was asserted in the case of US v. Wilheim List et al.,32 in which 
emphasis was laid on the knowledge of the commander of crimes committed 
by his underlings. List’s underlings had committed unlawful killings of 
civilians while he was away from the headquarters where he had command. 
List denied knowledge of the crimes with reference to his absence. The 
Tribunal found that with regards to List’s position, failure to obtain 
information constitutes a dereliction of duty which cannot be used as a 
defence.33 The Tribunal also found that List did not condemn the killings of 
thousands of individuals as unlawful acts nor did he hold the delinquents 
                                                
29 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, UN 
Doc. A/51/10, 6 May - 26 July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first 
session, Supplement No.10, p. 35; the reasoning was followed by the Tokyo Trials, ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC. 
30 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
14 November 1945 1 October 1946, directed by the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the 
jurisdiction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany, Nuremberg, Germany, 1947, 
vol.i, Official Documents, p. 11. 
31 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council 
Law No. 10 (Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949, United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington D. C., 1950, vol. i, p. xvii (Trials). 
32 Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, the ”Hostage Case”, US Military Tribunal V, 
Nuremberg, Judgment of 19 February 1948 - Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Volume XI/2. A case in 
which alleged criminal conduct occurred while the defendants were acting as field 
commanders or chiefs of staff to field commanders in south-eastern Europe. The defendants 
were charged with the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
33Trials, vol. xi, p. 1271.  
 23 
accountable for the vicious acts.34 As List did not act against these acts nor 
took preventive measures, he was considered to be in breach of duty imposing 
criminal liability. The Tribunal, therefore, held him responsible for the acts 
committed by his underlings.35 
 
Command responsibility was for the first time thoroughly discussed in the 
case of US v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., similar to the case of US v. Wilhelm 
List et al., at the same Tribunal.36 The Tribunal acknowledged that criminal 
responsibility comes with breaches of international law but that it has to 
address issues at hand with regards to recognised central principles of 
criminal law on which opinion juris existed.37 The Tribunal focused on 
Article II(2) (c) and (d) of Control Council Law No. 10 and drew the 
conclusion that the commander is culpable for acts of violence committed by 
his underlings even in the event that the commander did nothing but only 
stood by.38 However, “this act or neglect to act must be voluntary or 
criminal”39 and the culpability must be frankly traceable to the commander or 
“where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal 
negligence [was] on his part.”40 Commanders Hoth and Hollidt were held 
guilty for failing to act. The remaining defendants were held guilty for directly 
giving unlawful orders resulting in deaths of thousands of persons. 
 
As the principle of command responsibility has been broadened and 
recognised internationally, it is not at fault to stress that the principle is rooted 
in and has emerged from domestic practices. But can it be held that the 
principle of command responsibility is the same as vicarious and strict 
liability?41 As it is possible to hold that command responsibility has emerged 
from domestic judicial decisions based on the above, it is possible to highlight 
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 1272. 
35 Ibid., pp. 1274 and 1318. 
36 Ibid., pp. 462 ff;  Parks, pp. 1, 38.  
37 Trials, vol. xi, p. 509 
38 Ibid., p. 512. 
39 Ibid., p. 543. 
40 Ibid., pp. 543-544. Emphasis added. 
41 ”The Doctrine of Command Responsibility: Current Problems”, 3 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law (2000), pp. 131 and 162. 
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that this principle has derived from the specific domestic context that 
prevailed at the time.42 For example, Article 1 of the Regulations annexed to 
the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, which is a source of international 
humanitarian law, might have been highly influenced by practices of 
domestic law as it voices that states are responsible for the acts of state actors. 
Unfortunately, personal criminal liability was not explicitly voiced per se but 
was recognised in later judicial decisions.43  
 
The landmark case in which command responsibility was discussed and 
developed is the case of Yamashita,44 where it was held that command 
responsibility is well recognised under international law in accordance with 
Article 1 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. Nevertheless, Article 1 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention45 refers to state liability, which was discussed 
in the case,46 but was not very much stressed as the interpretation of the 
Article and its meaning was more in lieu of de lege ferenda than de lege lata 
as Commander Yamashita expressly conceded that he was under a duty under 
international law. Yamashita stressed that his duty consisted of controls of his 
troops to ensure that they are not committing any criminal acts. He also 
stressed that if a superior ordered his underlings to commit criminal acts or if 
he failed to prevent them from committing such crimes implies criminal 
liability on the superior.47 As this was highlighted, a new principle of law was 
generated and was rather imputed than found; command responsibility exist 
when the superior fails in his duty over his subordinates and four principal 
elements emerged; 1) requiring the prosecution to show criminal negligence 
albeit his knowledge of the illicit acts committed by his subordinates, 2) that 
the commanders neglect resulted in compliance, 3) that the failure to act has 
                                                
42 Parks, pp. 5-10. 
43 Report of the International Law Commission on the work o fits forty-eight session, 6 May 
– 26 July 1996, UNGA, Official Records, 51st Session, Supplement No.10 (A/51/10), p. 35. 
44 Rogers, A., Law on the Battlefield, (Manchester University Press, Manchester and New 
York, 1996), p. 130; Green, L., ’Superior Orders and Command Responsibility’, 27 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1989), pp. 167 and 194. 
45 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
46 Law Reports, vol. iv, p. 32. 
47 Ibid., p.29. 
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been voluntary and 4) that the commander could be found guilty of the illegal 
acts committed by his subordinates. Consequently, these judicial decisions 
evolved to become a source of international criminal law.48  
 
The Yamashita case created a new understanding of what law is and what 
international law is based on by imputing individual criminal liability to 
superiors. Cases of command responsibility require findings of the existence 
of a duty of control that was intentionally failed or culpably or maliciously 
disregarded despite knowledge,49 and if severe results have stemmed, or 
persisted unpunished, because of the violation. As clear the doctrine seems to 
be, as is it flawed due to the problematic issues of ultra vires or ex-post facto 
law.  
2.1.1 The Issues of Ultra Vires or Ex-Post Facto Law 
The principle of command criminal liability does not constitute an offence 
per se but rather emphasises one in similarity to the doctrine of aiding and 
abetting and involves the establishment of a superiors’ responsibility for illicit 
acts committed by his or her underlings or for his or her failure to prevent 
these criminal acts from occurring. However, the doctrine remains unclear as 
it does not specify whether the commander is responsible for his or her own 
failure to act or for the crimes of his or her underlings over which he or she 
had the power to prevent or repress.  
 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions50 does not give much 
guidance in relation to the interpretation of the doctrine as its Article 86(2) is 
uncertain in this matter. A provision with a similar wording can be found in 
                                                
48 Jia, B.B., ’Judicial decisions as a source of international law and the defence of duress in 
murder or other cases arising from armed conflict’, in S. Yee and W. Tieya (eds.), 
International Law in the Post-Cold War World (Essays in memory of Li Hao Pei), (London 
and New York, Routledge Studies in International Law, Routledge, 2001), pp. 77, 85, and 
94.  
49 Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement 
and Reasons, 3 July 2002, paras. 35 and 36 
50 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
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the ICTY Statute51 Article 7(3) but does not assist one in resolving the 
problem of uncertainty. Favourably, the UN Secretary-General held that the 
doctrine imposes command responsibility “for failure to prevent a crime or to 
deter the unlawful behaviour of his subordinates.”52 Accordingly, the 
commander is not responsible for the illicit acts committed by his underlings. 
Contrastingly, Article 28 of the Rome Statute provides that a commander in 
effective control is responsible for the illicit acts of his underlings as a result 
of failure to exercise control adequately over such forces including in cases 
over which the ICC has jurisdiction. Seen the wording of the Article, it is 
possible to perceive the existence of the interconnection between command 
responsibility and crimes committed by subordinates; the commander is seen 
as a co-operator in the performance of the delinquent acts.  If the commander 
is to be seen as a co-perpetrator, Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute would no 
longer be applicable as Article 7(1) prescribes liability in a diversity of roles.53 
Another link constituting an element of criminal liability is the inaction of the 
superior and the crimes committed by his or her underlings; the superior 
might know about the crimes committed by his or her underlings but his or 
her knowledge did not cause the subordinate delinquencies to take place. In 
other words, there is no proof of causality.54 What approach is then correct 
and what is the most referred to provision in international case law?  
 
2.1.1.1 ICTY and ICTR Case Law 
 
As much explicit guidance about the interpretation and application of criminal 
liability has not been given in the statutes of international criminal tribunals, 
                                                
51 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (as amended on 17 May 2002), 25 May 1993. 
52 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993) [Contains text of the Statute of the International Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991], 3 May 1993, S/25704, 
para. 56. 
53 Please compare ICTY Statute. Article 7(1) with UN Security Council, Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13 October 2006), 8 
November 1994, (ICTR Statute) Article 6(1); and ICTY Statute Article 7(3) with ICTR 
Ststatute Article 6(3). 
54 Justice Murphy, Dissenting Opinion in the Matter of the Application of General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita, 327 U.S., October 1945, in Law Reports, vol. iv, pp. 35 and 39. 
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the tribunals have had to struggle between two interpretations and 
applications of command responsibility; on the one hand to impose criminal 
liability on the superior for his or her own failure to act, and on the other hand 
to impose criminal liability on him or her for crimes committed by his or her 
underlings. 
 
It was held in the case of Aleksovski that a commander is to be considered 
guilty for his or her failure to act and not for the acts prescribed in Article 7(1) 
ICTY Statute per se. Accordingly, the commander is liable for the acts of his 
underlings in the event that he or she did not prevent the illicit acts from 
occurring or failed to punished the underlings for committing such crimes.55 
In the case of Blaskic, the Tribunal held that a person may be held accountable 
for the crimes committed by individuals that are not explicitly his or hers 
subordinates; as long as effective control exists, liability may be imposed.56 
Additionally, criminal liability exists where the accused is involved in the 
illicit acts and omissions falling under Article 7(3) ICTY Statute.57 
 
The same Tribunal found that a superior can be held liable for crimes 
committed by members belonging to his or her unit,58 but only if he or she 
had knowledge or reason to know of the crimes and that he or she had the 
ability to prevent them from occurring or punish the members of the unit 
committing the crimes.59 Moreover, “[c]ustomary international law 
recognizes that some war crimes can be committed by a member of an 
organized military force in the course of an internal armed conflict; it 
                                                
55 Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 25 
June 1999, para. 67. 
56 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 3 March 
2000, para. 301; compare to Article 28, in UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998 (Rome Statute); see also 
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 20 
February 2001, para. 198; Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgement, 15 March 2002, para. 93. 
57 Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgement, 26 February 2001, para. 843.  
58 Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgement, 31 March 2003, para. 163. 
59 Ibid., para. 116; see also Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic et al, Case No. IT-01-47-
AR72, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 16 July 2003, para. 18.  
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therefore also recognizes that there can be command responsibility in respect 
of such crimes.”60 This indicates that the superior is to be held “guilty of an 
offence committed by others even though he neither possessed the applicable 
mens rea nor had any involvement what so ever in the acuts reus.”61 The 
jurisprudence of ICTR holds that individual criminal liability can only be 
imposed on a commander if he or she had knowledge or reason to know of 
possible illicit acts committed by his or her underlings and failed to take 
adequate measures to prevent the acts from occurring or punish the 
perpetrators.62 
 
Consequently, it can be argued that there is no clear guidance on how to 
interpret the above-mentioned Articles on whether a superior is to be held 
guilty for his failure to act or for the acts committed by his or her underlings. 
However, if command responsibility is to be understood correctly, the case of 
Delalic has to be read e contrario; where a superiors’ inaction is not the 
reason of the crimes committed by his or her underlings can the superiors’ 
liability in the crimes be identified by reference to the principle of command 
liability.63 As it has been suggested in the case of Blaskic, a failure in 
command duty can be the reason for a superiors’ liability for either aiding and 
abetting or instigating crimes that are or ought to be performed by his or her 
underlings.64 This becomes valid as the superiors’ inaction is his or her actus 
reus and his or her knowledge or probable knowledge is the mens rea. Thus 
it is reasonable to hold that failure in command duty is an accepted offence in 
international law and is therefore continuously used in practice.65 On the 
whole, cases regarding de jure and de facto superiors are all based on the 
requirement of the existence of effective control.66 
                                                
60 Hadzihasanovic et al, Appeal Judgement, para. 18. 
61 Ibid., para 32. 
62 Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagelishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgement (Reasons), 3 July 
2002, para. 33. 
63 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 16 
November 1998, paras. 398 and 400. 
64 Blaskic, Trial Judgement, para. 337; M. Lippman, ”The Evolution of Scope of Command 
Responsibility”, Leiden Journal of International Law (2001), p. 139. 
65 Delalic et al.,Trial Chamber Judgement, para 346. 
66 Delalic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, paras. 196-197, 226, 238 and 241; Hadzihasanovic 
et al, Appeal Judgement, para. 38; Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial 
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2.1.2 Planning, Instigating and Otherwise Aiding and 
Abetting 
The doctrine of aiding and abetting exists since early 1900 if Articles 50 and 
34 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 are to be read together67 but is 
for the first time explicitly spelt out in Article 6(3) in the Statute of the 
International Military Tribunal including accomplices as a form of criminal 
liability. As Article 6(3) is not clear enough with regards to the forms of 
liability as of when culpability arise, one might seek a further explanation in 
Article II(2) of the Control Council Law No. 10 that is provided with an 
explanation of situations and forms of liability attached to them.68 Notably,  
case-wise it was considered that the accomplices’ knowledge of the incentive 
of the acts of violence by the superior was enough to meet the requirements 
satisfying the mens rea for aiding and abetting.69 Remarkably, all cases 
involved a person with direct control over economic actors or an accessor 
within the economic actor. The corporations themselves were never charged 
as the principal or the accessor was held guilty according to the law. 
 
                                                
Chamber Judgment, 16 November 2005, paras. 66, 68-69, 72-73 and 97; Prosecutor v. 
Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 29 July 2004, paras. 
62, 72 and 83; Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13, Trial Chamber 
Judgement 27 January 2000 (Musema was the directo of a tea factory and used his effective 
control to set up road blocks. He is considered to be a military commander under the 
doctrine); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, 20 June 2007, 
paras. 792, 794 and 798; Prosecutor v. Bemba Gobmo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 (A 
political superior who effectively acted as commander). Note that the mental element in the 
Rome Statute differs from other international tribunals as Article 28 separates military 
commanders from other individuals in hold of a command position; Judge Bakone Justice 
Moloto, ’Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals’, 3 Berkley Journal 
of International Law publicist (2009), p. 17. 
67 Eser, A. ’Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. WD. Jones, 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 767, 784. 
68 See in example the case of Flick, VI Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals, p. 1192; The case of the I.G. Farben, VII-VIII Trials of War Criminals 
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals; The case of Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals 
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals p. 1436; The case of Zyklon B, I Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals 93, Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, 1946; The case of 
Roechling, Superior Military Government Court of the French Occupation Zone in 
Germany (1949), XIV Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, p. 
1436 (1952). 
69 Flick, p. 1217; United States v. Von Weizsaecker, IX Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals 621-622, 1952. 
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By the year of 1948, complicity was given acknowledgement in the Genocide 
Convention and two years later in the Nuremberg Principles.70 The liability 
mode of aiding and abetting was given a clear formulation in the Draft Code 
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 199671 but has 
existed since 1949 in the four Geneva Conventions,72 yet not in the broad 
sense as of today.73 With regards to the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, Articles 
7(1) and 6(1) respectively, it is clear that indirect and accomplice liability 
besides direct criminal liability exist. Notwithstanding, as these forms of 
liability are sanctioned they remain unclear as commission and offender are 
not fully defined74 but recalled by reference to the principle of individual 
responsibility75 since it is well established in customary international law.76 
Consequently, the actus reus and mens rea were defined.77 Regarding the 
                                                
70 Article 3 of the Genocide Convention and Principle VII of the Nuremberg Principles. 
71 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, 
International Law Commission, 1996, Article 2(3)(d); Rayfuse, R., ’The Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Eating Disorder at the International Law 
Commission’, 8 Criminal Law Forum (1997), p. 50-52. 
72 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First 
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
73 See Article 49 Convention I, Article 50 Convention II, Article 129 Convention III, Article 
146 Convention IV. 
74 Prosecutorv v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 15 July 
1999, para. 186. 
75 Delalic, Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 319. 
76 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgement and Opinion, 
7 May 1997, paras. 666-669; Delalic, Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 321 
77 For ICTR case law on the matter see Prosecutorv. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-
4-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 484; for further information on the 
elements see Cassese A., et al., International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 24 February 2011), p. 395 at para 233; Prosecutor v. Anto 
Furundzia, Case No. IT-95-17/ I-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 
232-235, 245-246 and 252; Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 229; Prosecutorv. 
Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1 -A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgement, 1 June 2001, para. 186; Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, 
Appeals Chamber Judgement, 17 September 2003, paras. 33 and 51; Prosecutorv. Mitar 
Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 25 February 2004, para. 102; 
Blaskic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 49; Blaskic, Trial Judgement, paras. 286-287; 
Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, 31 January 
2005, para. 350; Naletilic and Martinovic, Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 63; Prosecutorv. 
Miroslav Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 2 November 
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Rome Statute, it has a more coherent provision on the issue78 stressing that a 
person is to be held liable if he or she facilitates, aids, abets or otherwise 
assists the commence of a crime that is about to, that is being or has been 
committed.79 Equally, liability arises when an individual contributes to the 
commission of such an act of violence by a group of individuals acting with 
a common purpose.80 Moreover, the aider and/or abettor has to have the aim 
to foster the criminal aim or activity involving the commence of a violent act 
of the group81 while in knowledge of the culpable intent of it.82  
 
Despite the well-developed provision, the notion or distinction of the actus 
reus and mens rea remain ambiguous.83 Equally unclear is the level of 
participation with regards to sanctions. However, if Article 25(3) is read 
carefully, it can be distinguished that support is divided into two categories; 
1) aiding and abetting or otherwise assisting84 and 2) contribution to the 
commission of an illicit act of a group.85 To aid, abet or otherwise assist are 
three separate concepts where the third concept is open-ended making the list 
                                                
2001, para. 255; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Appeals Chamber 
Judgement, 30 May 2001, para. 162; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic et al., Case IT-95-9-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, 17 October 2003, para. 163; Krnojelac, Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 
90; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, Trial Chamber II, 
Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 392; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic, 
Case No. IT-02-60, Trial Chamber I Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 727; Tadic, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, para. 692; in relation to the crime of genocide see Articles 6(1) ICTR 
Statute and 7(1) ICTY Statute; for complicity see Articles 2(3)(e) ICTR Statute and 4(3)(e) 
ICTY Statute;  Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgement, paras. 485, 538-548; Prosecutor v. 
Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T and ICTR-96-17-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgement and Sentence, 21 February 2003, para. 787; Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgement and Sentence, 15 May 2003, 
paras. 394-395; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgement, 31 July 2003, paras. 531-534; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-
A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 139-142; Partial Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Shahabuddeen, Part G.1: There is a crime of aidingand abetting the commission of 
genocide, paras. 59-68; Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-
96-1O-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 13 December 2004, paras. 500-
501; Blagojevic and Jokic, Trial Chamber I Judgement, paras.  678-680. 
78 Article 25(3) of the Rome Satute; Cassese/Paola Gaeta/John R. WD. Jones, pp. 767 and 
774. 
79 Article 25(3)(c) Rome Statute. 
80 Article 25(3)(d) Rome Statute. 
81 Article 25(3)(d)(1) Rome Statute. 
82 Article 25(3)(d)(2) Rome Statute; As regards genocide, direct and public incitement by the 
aider and/or abettor must exist, see Article 25(3)(e) Rome Statute. 
83 Cassese/Paola Gaeta/John R. WD. Jones, pp. 767 and 787-788. 
84 Article 25(3)(c) Rome Statute. 
85 Article 25(3)(d) Rome Statute. 
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of assisting acts non-exhaustive. However, knowledge of the commence of a 
crime is not satisfactory; intent must be proven in order to impose liability on 
the aider and/or abettor. As for contribution, it is considered to be enough to 
have knowledge of the intention of the group and that the aim of the 
contributor is to encourage the criminal activity or the purpose of the group 
in order to impose liability on the contributor.86 As clarity about the 
distinction between the two types of assistance evolves, the wording of the 
latter remains uncertain as it does not explicitly determine whether or not the 
contributor has to be a member of the group in question.87 However, what is 
the group in question? The provision seems to be ambiguous with regards to 
whether or not it is a reference to JCE, however, very little doubt exists in this 
regard.88 Moreover, when examining the jurisprudence of ICTY and ICTR it 
becomes possible to perceive the Article as affirming the existence of both 
modes of liability; as aider and/or abettor not belonging to the group and as 
aider and/abettor belonging to a JCE or conspiracy as of in the Rome Statute. 
 
2.2 JCE Liability: Expanding Command 
Responsibility to Include Entities 
JCE is a concept defined to be a form of criminal involvement and was 
established through the jurisprudence of the ICTY but can be traced back to 
the Post-WWII trials,89 where JCE is referred to as being a conspiracy,90 and 
other international treaties.91 Moreover, it is a concept not aiming at holding 
single perpetrators, as in superiors or those who aid and abet, liable but rather 
all persons involved for the joint commence of illicit acts.92 The morality 
behind the concept has been explained as being a fair strike against all persons 
involved as they have together commenced crimes beyond what is morally 
                                                
86 Cassese/Paola Gaeta/John R. WD. Jones, pp. 767 and 803. 
87 Ibid., pp. 767, 783, 789 and 903. 
88 Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 222. 
89 Ibid., paras. 195, 197-220. 
90 van der Wilt, H., ’Joint Criminal Enterprise: Possibilities and Limitations’, Journal of 
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acceptable, because “to hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person 
who materially performs the criminal act would disregard the role as co-
perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for the perpetrator 
physically to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, depending upon 
the circumstances, to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors might 
under state the degree of their criminal responsibility.”93 The existence of a 
JCE is determined by its characteristics provided that there has to be a 
common plan or purpose that is about to be, that currently is being, or has 
been commenced by a group of individuals. All individuals that participate 
through direct or indirect involvement or contribute in any other way in the 
commence of the illicit acts may be subjected to criminal liability.94 The scope 
of JCE had been established primarily to aim at those involved in criminal 
organisations i.e. detention camps.95  
 
As regards the doctrine of JCE and aiding and abetting, JCE has been 
considered to be a form of accomplice liability,96 however, aiding and 
abetting require that the a) aider or abettor is not directly involved in the 
commence of the prohibited act, b) there is no plan of commencing a 
prohibited act that the aider or abettor has agreed upon together with the 
principal perpetrator, c) the aim of the aider or abettor is to only assist and 
encourage the commence of the crime or the pursuance of a common plan or 
purpose and d) only knowledge of the commence is required,97 it becomes 
hard to stress that individuals aiding and abetting should be held equally liable 
as the individuals belonging to a JCE; as aforementioned, aiders and abettors 
might have their culpability lessened thereof. Moreover, it is worth 
highlighting that in the scenario that one is aiding and abetting a JCE, the 
intent of the culprits involved is not shared with the aider and abettor. 
However, knowledge of such assistance must exist.98 JCE liability is in this 
                                                
93 Ibid., para. 192; Blagojevic and Jokic, Trial Chamber, para. 695. 
94 Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 190; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, Case 
No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 258. 
95 van der Wilt, p. 92. 
96 Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 220. 
97 Ibid., para. 229. 
98 Kvocka et al., Trial Chamber Judgement, paras. 273 and 282-289. 
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sense aptly different from accomplice liability.99 Additionally, there are three 
modes of JCE liability identified by the ICTY and are referred to as basic, 
systemic and extended JCE liability.100 Contrastingly, as regards the Rome 
Statute, the notion of JCE or conspiracy101 can be derived from the wordings 
jointly with another, a crime by a group of persons with a common purpose 
and aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting. “The idea that when the sum of 
the co-ordinated individual contributors of a plurality of persons result in the 
realization of all the objective elements of a crime, any person making a 
contribution can be held vicariously responsible for the contributions of all 
the others and, as a result, can be considered as a principle to the whole 
crime.”102 There are three sorts of classifications of perpetration in the 
meaning of strictu senso; direct individual perpetration, joint perpetration 
commenced through co-operation and indirect individual perpetration 
commenced through another person,103 all of which are based on the control 
over crime approach entailing two additional requisites besides intent and 
knowledge; mutual knowledge and knowledge of the importance of their 
role,104 which is not much different from JCE.105 
                                                
99 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgement, 28 February 2005, para. 79; Blagojevic and Jokic, Trial Chamber, para. 696. 
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3 Leading Theories on Corporate 
Criminal Liability in the Wake of 
Domestic Practices 
3.1 Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability is based on the notion that judicial persons are imputed 
with corporate criminal liability for crimes commenced by natural persons 
and originates from the notion of command responsibility.106 In English law 
exists a rule stressing that the principal should not be held liable for acts 
committed by his or her subordinate. However, this rule is only applicable in 
the event that the crime has been committed without knowledge or 
authorisation by the principal, even in the event that the crime has been 
commenced within the scope of the subordinates employment.107 However, 
the principle of extensive construction and the delegation principle constitute 
two notions that are one exception to the previously mentioned rule. The 
primary principle holds the principal liable in cases where the employee has 
commenced illicit acts while the second principle holds the principle liable if 
and when the principal has authorised a statutory duty to the employee.108 
Another exception to the rule imputes liability on the principal if public 
nuisance occurs.109 Other explicit exceptions do not exist. On the other hand, 
US legislation holds that it is irrelevant what position an employee has 
hierarchically; the corporation is to be held liable regardless. The main 
difference between English law and US legislation lays in the wake of the 
penal provisions requiring both guilt and a judicial requisite; where such 
elements exist, the superior defendant should not be penalised if it can be 
proven that he or she carried out adequate due diligence measures to prevent 
the commence of the crime. If the prohibited crime that is commenced by an 
employee lacks the guilt requisite, the Model Penal Code that constructs strict 
                                                
106 Ledeman, p. 652. 
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Press, 2014), p. 773. 
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 36 
liability is applied.110 Contrastingly, Canada applies vicarious liability more 
narrowly; it is only applied in cases where the prohibition of a commenced 
crime lacks the guilt requisite. The Canadian provisions are categorised in 
two branches of regulations; absolute criminal liability and strict criminal 
liability. The primary cover acts of administrative crime while the latter is 
basically based on the same approach as the prior with the additional 
requirement of proof of lack of due diligence measures taken by the principal 
in order to thoroughly prevent the commenced crime. The prerequisite 
required in order to impute corporate criminal liability on a company is that 
the employee has commenced the crime within the scope of the 
employment.111  
 
However, there are some problems that need to be discussed in relation to this 
theory. Imputing corporate criminal liability through vicarious liability is not 
ultimate as it aims at punishing a physical individual for the crimes committed 
by another and not a corporation per se. Seemingly, the theory is controversial 
as it does not follow the principle of guilt; it punishes a person that has not 
committed a crime.112 However, as the theory is of the notion of the 
economic-industrial social sphere, which is an exception in criminal law 
theory due to efficiency, prosecution of an individual for the crimes 
commenced by another is justified and in accordance with criminal law 
standards.113 In sum, vicarious liability can be seen as command responsibility 
where the leading official is culpably liable for the crimes committed by his 
or her soldiers. The author would like to stress that as important the theory 
might seem, it does not help the author to fully answer the question of whether 
or not corporations per se can be held criminally liable, which allows for 
further discussions on another theory dealing with the issue at hand. 
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3.2 Theory of Identification 
The so-called theory of alter ego holds the judicial person liable per se and 
differs from the previous model as it does not touch upon vicarious liability 
of natural persons and their culpability; it simply constructs independent 
criminal liability of corporations, which allows criminal law to preserve its 
strong core in cases where the provision of the prohibited act has a vague or 
is leaking the guilt requisite.114 In difference from vicarious liability, the 
theory of  alter ego is broader and deeper as it establishes corporate intent and 
involves a penalty for corporations that have commenced intentional 
offences. Moreover, natural persons are considered as organs of the corporate 
body in the sense that they are the limbs and brains of the company.115 In this 
way, the theory of alter ego gives the corporation all the physiognomies of a 
physical individual, which fulfils the criterion for vicarious liability. Thus, 
the requisite for independent, non-vicarious, liability is fulfilled and the 
strong core of criminal law is maintained. 
 
English practices extend corporate criminal liability to cover acts of which 
the prohibition requires guilt; namely, through identification of the director 
as he or she constitutes the directing mind.116 Seemingly, only the superior 
that constitutes the leader or equivalent can attribute corporate criminal 
liability to the company through incarnation as he or she is acting in the name 
of the company.117 In other words, the incarnation of the corporation opens 
up for the court to impute corporate criminal liability on the company per 
se.118 However, what is conclusive is whether or not the directing mind was 
acting within his or her official capacity.119 Contrastingly, US practices 
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impute corporate criminal liability on legal entities in cases where the 
corporate leading representative has allowed, ordered or through negligence 
accepted wilful commence of illicit crimes.120 Same standards are applied in 
Canadian121 and French122 doctrine if the provision on the commenced crime 
requires guilt. 
 
In difference from vicarious liability, the theory of alter ego provides 
subjectivity to the notion of what a legal person is through analogy to the 
physical individual in criminal law. However, what seems problematic is the 
delimitation allowing corporate criminal liability only in cases where the 
director of the company is involved.123 Therefore, questions equivalent to 
“What approach should be applied when individuals that hierarchically stand 
below the superior commit prohibited crimes?” arise. It might, in theory, be 
possible to solve the problem through analogy drawn upon the mode of JCE 
discussed above and punish the entity as a whole especially in cases where a 
leader or directing mind does not exist. In this way, all individuals involved 
will constitute the directing mind, limbs and other organs and construct the 
corporate person’s alter ego. 
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4 Corporate Criminal Liability in 
Domestic Practices 
In brevitis, domestic law has laid the foundation for individual and entity 
liability. Thus, the author urges the discussion of national practices regarding 
corporate criminal liability on the domestic level in order to generate possible 
similarities between individual, group and corporate criminal liability in this 
chapter. Subsequently, a chapter depicting how these domestic practices have 
and may continue to influence international criminal law in its future 
development will follow.  
 
4.1 Corporate Complicity in Domestic 
Practices 
Generally, if a corporation acts in violation of international criminal law, 
there is a full possibility for prosecution of the corporate accused 
domestically. For example, if a company commits acts that constitute atrocity 
crimes124 it can be brought before US Courts under the ATCA.125 This applies 
especially to cases of complicity in which contractors have, for example, 
provided various interrogation methods to the US at the Abu Ghrab prison.126 
Another example is the lawsuit against Blackwater that allegedly is liable for 
war crimes connected to massive killings of civilians in September of 2007.127 
Notably, these corporations have been in association with the government 
when commencing these crimes, which naturally calls for state liability with 
regards to international humanitarian law. However, recent rulings at the US 
Courts have held that corporations that have committed atrocity crimes should 
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be held liable per se even in cases where state association is lacking.128 
Moreover, most of these cases concern the prohibited act of aiding and 
abetting acts that are sanctioned in international criminal law 129 and therefore 
turn to accomplice liability.  
 
The US has considered the Rome Statute when applying relevant provisions 
in the ATCA, especially regarding the rule on complicity as it allows a claim 
to be made against a corporation. Markedly, for corporate criminal liability to 
be imputed on a company, it is considered to be enough if it can be shown 
that a corporate entity is complicit in human rights violations committed by a 
government. However, the act of accomplice must stem in a corporate 
obligation towards the government as in the case of Khulumani v. Barclay 
National Bank, Ltd; Ntsebeza v. Daimler Chrysler Corporation where several 
multinational corporations that commenced business in South Africa by 
providing the government with resources, which lead to the commence of 
genocide and human rights violations amongst others.130 As regards the 
identification of corporate intent, the US Court turns to the Rome Statute and 
its Article 25(3) that has been discussed above. It was held that the mens rea 
for complicity is satisfied when it can be shown that a group of persons acted 
with a common purpose to facilitate the commence of a crime by another 
person(s).131 Seemingly, it is quite easy to hold a corporation liable according 
to these practices, which might appear virtuous.  
 
However, the author does not want to be too enthusiastic and will thus present, 
according to her, two flaws. What strikes the author in hoc casu is that the 
discussions have been centrally based upon the relationship between the 
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corporation and the government; not once has the relationship between a 
corporation and for instance a JCE been touched upon despite the fact that 
aiding and abetting a group with a common purpose is prohibited under the 
Rome Statute.132 In cases of assistance to a JCE, the corporation does not need 
to have a purpose but rather knowledge of the intention of the JCE, which is 
a different approach requiring another level of proof to be satisfied 
indifference from the discussed approach. The other issue at stake is the 
suggestion that the assistance test is of divergent nature and is thus not 
consistent with customary international law.133 Notably, the Rome Statute 
does refer to other treaties and decisions by other international tribunals, but 
that does not per se indicate that the assistance test in the Rome Statute is 
different from customary international law.  
 
Ad cuius evidentiam, the first issue regarding assistance to a JCE has been 
clarified by the ICTY stressing that anyone involved in the commence of a 
crime committed by a group with a common purpose is to be held liable 
regardless of the nature of the participation. In other words, it is irrelevant if 
the participation was of direct or indirect nature; what is significant is that the 
mere contribution was necessary for the fulfilment of the JCE’s common 
plan.134 Moreover, there are three forms of JCE liability, all of which have 
different requirements for the fulfilment of the mental element of crime; 
basic, systemic and extended JCE liability.135 The ICC holds that in cases of 
complicity, two forms of mens rea must be shown; intent to contribute and 
knowledge of the JCE’s intention, could mean that corporate criminal liability 
can be imputed on a corporate body if it (1) intends to achieve the criminal 
aim of the JCE or if it (2) complies with the JCE despite knowledge of the 
JCE’s aim and possible outcomes that can result from achievement of the 
aim.136 Paraetera, as regards knowledge and intention, three types of dolus 
                                                
132 Article 25(3)(d) Rome Statute  
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exist; dolus directus of first degree, dolus directus of second degree and dolus 
eventualis, all of which are examined separately.137 The author finds it not 
necessary to go into depth with them as she rather wanted to show how 
corporate complicity can be understood and how the rules of the Rome Statute 
can be used in domestic courts in order to impute corporate criminal liability 
on corporate bodies.  
 
Regarding the second issue, the issue of actus reus, the US Court of Appeal 
held that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law 
requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a 
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”138 However, it was never 
clarified what substantial effects involve. Seen to the reference, it might be 
argued that it indicates on compliance through presence; most accordingly, as 
encouragement through presence in war zones, not lucrative facets139 as the 
issue of the assistance test is founded in cases where all the defendants have 
been in a command position and have been acting as the directing mind.140 
Now, the author wants to stress that if the ideology of the assistance test is to 
be interpreted as in necessitating corporate presence in the state or area where 
the crime is committed, alike command presence, criminal law would lose its 
strong core at it would allow for culprits to commence criminal acts from 
abroad. Logically and despite lack of discussions in relation to Article 
25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, it can be held that the corporate accomplice 
does not need to be based where the crimes are committed, nor does it have 
to share the particular intent of the directing mind but should at least be aware 
of their contribution and what it is resulting in.141 
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As the US has considered the Rome Statute and interpreted its rules when 
dealing with complaints under the ATCA, many other national jurisdictions 
have adopted their national law to correspond to the Rome Statute to facilitate 
prosecution of those that have committed international crimes. Holland is one 
example. The Judiciary of the Netherlands convicted a man working in a 
supply chain for complicity as he was contributing with chemicals to Iraq, 
which could be used to produce mustard gas, this chemical weapon was used 
as means to commit genocide. A quantum of questions of concern arose while 
dealing with the case; namely, how genocidal intent is supposed to be 
established and what degree of effect of the contribution is needed to impute 
compliance liability on the contributor. It was held that “[t]hrough his 
conscious contribution to the production of mustard gas in a country at war, 
the defendant knew under those circumstances that he was the one who 
supplied the material and created the occasion for the actual use of the gas, in 
the sense that he was very aware of the fact that in the given circumstances 
the use of this gas could not and would not fail to materialise. Particularly: 
the defendant was very aware of the fact that ‘in the ordinary cause [sic] of 
events’ – the gas was going to be used” for wrongful purposes. The Court 
then held that “the defendant […] was aware of the – also then known – 
unscrupulous character of the Iraqi regime” and was therefore held liable for 
complicity in international crimes.142 The author finds this case of particular 
interest as it holds that persons, alike in vicarious liability, can be held liable 
for complicity in international crimes if they do not exercise improved 
awareness.143 However, this same case is less appealing to base further 
arguments on as it holds natural persons liable and not companies per se. 
 
Nevertheless, French law extends the liability in cases of complicity to be 
applicable and attributable to corporate bodies. The French Penal Code 
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provides for corporate complicity liability in cases where legal persons 
contributed states with some form of assistance in the commence of 
international crimes.144 Paradoxically, French Law has required an explicit 
provision inquiring corporate liability;145 however, new legislation is 
stressing that explicit provisions under the Penal Code are not needed in order 
to hold corporations liable.146 Some critiques that have pointed out that the 
revision of the law is useless as it is highly impossible to hold corporations 
accountable for the crime of rape. The author agrees on that. However, 
corporations have full potential to carry out these crimes as accomplices and 
can thus be held liable for all crimes encompassed in the French Penal 
Code.147 Moreover and as aforementioned, corporate bodies have to take due 
diligence measures before operating and commencing any work or 
cooperation that might result in complicity or direct involvement in illicit 
crimes.148 This includes the persons working at the company and operating as 
the directing mind as they are considered to be its organs but only in the event 
that the legal entity acts on its own behalf through its directing mind, 
employees or other staff. In other words, the corporate body cannot be held 
liable if the director, employees or other staff act on their own behalf.149 
Interestingly, this same approach has been discussed but abolished during the 
Rome conference establishing the ICC and the Rome Statute,150 which will 
be further discussed in forthcoming chapters.  
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In difference from domestic practices that urge to identify the directing mind, 
Australian law, that has enhanced the Rome Statute in its domestic criminal 
law, takes another approach. Australian criminal law has formed the element 
of mens rea to explicitly fit a corporate body; it deals with the elements of 
fault other than negligence and negligence per se.151 The first category simply 
stresses that if a provision on the prohibition of a certain crime requires 
individual fault, the element of fault has to be imputed on the corporation if 
the corporate body in any way has authorised the commence of the crime. 
Certainly, corporate criminal liability cannot be linked to the corporation if it 
can be proven that it executed due diligence to inhibit the commission of the 
illicit act. Namely, corporate criminal liability is not imputed on the 
corporation when the corporate body authorises the commencement of illicit 
acts, regardless of the hierarchical position of the individuals that authorises 
the crime.152 The second category imputes corporate criminal liability on the 
corporation in the event that its employees, agents or officers commit but only 
if the commenced crime is a result of negligent corporate behaviour through 
in example inadequate corporate management and control.153 Noting the 
importance of corporate liability, the Australian Centre for Policy 
Development and the Future Business Council have recently drafted a legal 
opinion on climate change and director’s duties.154 In this memorandum, it is 
held that directors have a duty of care and diligence owed to the company155 
and that they should consider climate change risks before commencing any 
corporate conduct156 as such work might render “economic, environmental 
and social sustainability risks.”157 These risks involve i.e. “flooding and 
rising sea levels, which might […] damage property,”158 which in turn might 
                                                
151 Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995, C2016C01150, Articles 12.3 and 12.4. 
152 A definition of persons with the power to authorise certain acts is contained in Article 12.3 
of the Australian Criminal Code. 
153 Article 12.4 of the Australian Criminal Code. 
154 Hutley, N. SC and Hartford-Davis, S., Legal Opinion on Climate Change and Director’s 
Duties, Centre for Policy Development and the Future Business Council Memorandum of 
Opinion, 7 October 2016. 
155 Ibid., para. 10. 
156 Ibid., para. 11. 
157 Ibid., para. 12.  
158 Ibid., para. 15. 
 46 
amount in i.e. health-related deaths and displacement of people.159 Thus, if 
corporate directors do not exercise environmental diligence before any 
corporate conduct resulting in economic development, they should be 
rightfully held liable.160 The author finds this memorandum of high value as 
it raises awareness of the importance of corporate liability so that great 
tragedies alike the Bhopal disaster in India, can be avoided.161 The dilution of 
the topic to include environmental aspects will not be furthered as there is no 
room for it within the scope of this thesis. The slight expansion serves simply 
as an example to show to what extent corporate directors may be held liable 
for commencing corporate conduct to the cost of lives of innocent people. 
 
Additionally, as the discussions above are focusing on corporations 
committing or that are in complicity to the commence of atrocity crimes, the 
author wants to move back over the Ocean to Europe, namely the UK. The 
UK is of specific interest as it has adopted an Act on Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide.162 This specific Act holds corporations liable “if the 
way in which its activities are managed or organized by its senior 
management is a substantial element in the breach [of the duty of care].” 
Moreover, “a breach of a duty of care by an organisation is a ‘gross’ breach 
if the conduct alleged to amount to a breach of that duty falls far below what 
can be reasonably expected of the organisation in the circumstances.” These 
circumstances might be in “the making of decisions about how the whole or 
substantial part of its activities are to be organized, or […] the actual 
managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those 
activities.”163 In other words, the Act forms a new form of mens rea in order 
                                                
159 Ibid., paras. 17.4-17-5. 
160 Ibid., paras. 34, 36, 37 and 51-52. 
161 2nd December 1984 is the date when a toxic gas escaped from a tank of a fertilizer plant, 
owned and operated by Union Carbide India Ltd., resulting in the death of over 2300 people 
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C., ‘Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technology: Challenge for International 
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162 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 6 April 2008. 
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to facilitate prosecution of corporations in the event that their acts have 
contributed to some kind of loss of life. 
 
4.1.1 The Case of Chiquita Banana 
The multinational banana company Chiquita has pled guilty for knowingly 
providing material support of “prolonged, steady, and substantial” character 
as it stretched over a seven years period of time164 to the illegal paramilitary 
organisation AUC known for its illegal actions involving mass killings of 
Colombian civilians. Chiquita’s manager was working in accomplice with the 
AUC commander establishing organisations to better handle the financial aids 
functioning as legal fronts for the AUC,165 all of which were of illegal 
character.166 Besides the finances, the AUC received help from Chiquita to 
smuggle weapons and other ammunition through Chiquita’s private port,167 
all of which was used to commit the crime of mass killing.168 Chiquita’s gain 
consisted of uninterrupted banana plant areas where it could commence its 
work, without any competition, resulting in “monopolistic control over the 
banana commerce. […] Chiquita intended to and did financially benefit in the 
United States from the AUC’s systematic killings”169 of “social activists, 
teachers, community leaders, trade unionists, human rights defenders, 
religious workers and leftist politicians.” The AUC “also targeted people it 
considered socially undesirable, such as indigenous persons, drug addicts and 
petty criminals.”170  
 
Notably, the corporation was acting in this way due to benefits that it was 
gaining through the supporting finances.171 Therefore, the author wants to 
                                                
164In RE: Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Alien Tort Statute Litigation, Case No. 12-
14898-B, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cirquit, On Appeal from the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, No. 08-md-01916, Plaintiffs-
Appellees-Cross-Appellants’ Response Brief and Cross-Appeal Opening Brief, (In RE: 
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Alien Tort Statute Litigation), p. 1. 
165 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
166 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
167 Ibid., p. 12. 
168 Ibid., p. 13.  
169 Ibid., p. 13. 
170 Ibid., p. 14. 
171 Ibid., p. 2. 
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stress that Chiquita in its accomplice role is nothing less blameworthy than 
the AUC for the mass killings of Colombian civilians. The plaintiffs are 
survivors of the by AUC targeted groups172 claiming their rights under the 
ATCA.173 The reason why the US Court is dealing with this international case 
is founded on the fact that Chiquita is based in the US,174 because crimes 
against humanity (alike genocide) is an atrocity crime of jus cogens 
character,175 and due to the touch and concern with reference to the case of 
Kiobel.176  
 
Chiquita pled guilty177 before the US Court as the “mens rea of conspiracy is 
purpose and that of aiding and abetting is knowledge,”178 and that the requisite 
for conspiracy to war crimes is fulfilled according to international 
standards179 despite Chiquita’s argument that in order to be held liable the 
corporation must have intended to kill the assassinated individuals claiming 
that “those complicit in widespread slaughter are immune.”180 Because, with 
reference to international law, despite the fact that Chiquita did not intend to 
kill each and every victim, it is enough that the corporation agreed to at least 
one unlawful act out of which abuses have arisen for the achievement of the 
shared goal. For this statement, Chiquita’s intent to commence the 
assassination of each and every particular victim must not have been of 
existence.181 As regards aiding and abetting, knowledge of the injuries that 
emanated from the acts of the aider and abettor is insufficient.182 What 
suffices is that Chiquita was or should have been aware of that crimes might 
                                                
172 Ibid., p. 2. 
173 Ibid., p. 5. 
174 Ibid., pp. 3, 6 and 24-26. 
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 49 
be committed.183 Unfortunately, the lawsuit was dismissed as it was found 
that the ATCA does not apply extraterritorially. Judge Beverly Martin claims 
the opposite in her dissenting opinion. 
4.2 International Instruments on State 
Practices 
Despite the abolishment of criminalising corporate criminal behaviour during 
the Rome Conference, several other treaties have included corporate liability 
with reference to the importance of its existence. Guided or influenced by the 
discussion about imputing liability on a corporation through identification of 
the directing mind, corporate criminal liability is enhanced in the Council of 
Europe’s Criminal Convention on Corruption.184 Moreover, the EU goes a 
step further and enumerates various sanctions depending on the gravity of the 
committed crime in its Joint Action Plan consisting of two Conventions and 
Protocols. Remarkably, it asks the Member States to take appropriate 
measures to sanction corporate bodies, enumerates some possible sanctions 
but also stresses that the list of sanctions is not exhaustive.185 The author will 
not draw more attention to sanctions as they will be separately discussed in a 
forthcoming chapter. 
 
Furthermore, in a plenary sitting report on corporate liability for serious 
human rights abuses in third countries186 the European Parliament stressed 
the importance of international conventions with regards to human rights and 
asked corporations to “embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of 
influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, 
                                                
183 Ibid., p. 57. 
184 Article 18 of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Convention on Corruption, ETS No.173, 
Strasbourg, 27.I.1999. 
185 Joint Action of 22 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of 
the Treaty on European Union, on corruption in the private sector, Official Journal L 358, 
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25/06/1997 P. 0002 – 0011, p. 2-11; Convention on the protection of the European 
Communities financial interests, OJ C 316, 27 November 1995, p. 49-57. 
186 Report on Corporate Liability for Serious Human Rights Abuses in Third Countries 
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the environment and the fight against corruption, making a commitment to 
those values and integrating them into their business operations on a 
voluntary basis”187 as they are major players in the global economy;188 
because violations of rights committed by corporate bodies are a concern of 
global character189 and the protection of human rights is of essential 
importance to the Member States and the EU.190 Moreover, as the European 
Parliament has noted, exists does a lack of a holistic approach to corporate 
liability in cases where corporations have committed human rights abuses191 
and require a proper legal framework on the matter.192 Because human rights 
due diligence have to be carried out regardless as it is a moral and legal 
obligation to respect them. If due diligence is not taken, corporations should 
be subjected to i.e. pay restitution and compensation to the persons that have 
suffered harm from the corporate act.193 In lieu of this, the European 
Parliament encourages its Member States to partake in the preparation of a 
binding UN treaty on Business and Human Rights and to enact action against 
those corporate culprits and grant the victims access to effective remedy while 
the treaty is in progressive creation as the defence of human rights is of urgent 
matter.194 In the creation of the treaty, the European Commission is urged to 
create a “consistent body of law, including rules governing access to justice, 
jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions in civil and 
commercial matters, the applicable law, and judicial assistance in cross-
border situations.”195 To that end, it should “involve personal criminal 
liability, and [call] for those responsible for such crimes to be prosecuted at 
the appropriate level.”196   
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Interestingly, the UN has also approached the question of legal entities and 
their participation in the commence of illicit acts together with an organized 
criminal group through the creation of a convention; UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime was created in order to prevent international 
criminals from operating successfully and grant the world citizens safety and 
dignity in their homes and communities.197 Article 10 of the Convention 
prescribes that each State Party shall adopt necessary measures giving rise to 
corporate liability. However, despite the international character of the 
Convention, corporate liability remains to only be dealt with on the domestic 
level and not in the international domain.  
 
The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and 
Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and 
Security Companies During Armed Conflict is an additional document 
pertaining to the matter at hand.198 This intergovernmental document serves 
to promote and respect international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law whenever PMSCs are present in international armed 
conflicts.199 “As companies, PMSCs per se are not bound to respect 
international humanitarian law, which is binding only on parties to a conflict 
and individuals, not corporate entities. Nor are PMSCs bound by human 
rights law, which is only binding on States. […] [H]owever, insofar as those 
bodies of law are integrated into national law and made applicable to 
companies, PMSCs are nonetheless obliged to hold them. The same holds 
true, obviously, for all national law.”200 The document is not legally binding 
per se but as it consists of a compilation of international standards, it does 
serve as a crucial guideline on how to best prevent corporations from 
commencing crimes and how liability is imputed on the ones in breach of 
                                                
197 UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
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international humanitarian law.201 Notably, this only serves as basis 
guidelines in armed conflicts and not in non-armed conflicts, which is actually 
not true. The Montreux Document explicitly says that despite the fact that it 
is underpinned with international humanitarian law standards that only apply 
in armed conflicts, the document highlights best practices confined in 
peacetime as well indicating that there is no necessity of the existence of an 
armed conflict in order for these principles to be respected by states.202 In the 
event that corporations commit illicit crimes, corporate criminal liability is 
imputed through superior criminal liability203 as a form of vicarious liability. 
At some times, corporate liability can be imputed on the State as a question 
of international law but that is only if the corporation is acting in support of 
the government.204 State responsibility will not be further discussed as it falls 
outside the scope of the thesis. 
 
The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers205 
is similar to the Montreux Document as it endorses its rules and is an 
agreement that serves as a first step in the promotion of effective control and 
impunity of PSCs. Since September 2013, over 700 corporations are formally 
committed to operating according to the rules set out in the Code of Conduct 
and the main focus now is to establish an autonomous legal instrument for 
corporate control and surveillance to raise awareness and promote good 
practices and human rights.206 However and yet again, if corporate criminal 
liability is found, it is to be dealt with on the domestic level, not 
internationally until further development gives rise to the formation of a 
mechanism allowing international corporate prosecution for major 
wrongdoings, which takes us to the next chapter. 
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5 Corporate Criminal Liability in 
International Criminal Law 
One of the reasons why corporate criminal liability has not been accepted as 
a mode of liability in international criminal law are the objections with 
reference to difficulties of the assessment and well established principles of 
international criminal law, mainly through argumentation that the principle of 
societas delinquere non potest has to be upheld as corporations have no body 
to kick and no soul to damn.207 Furthermore, the argumentation concludes that 
corporate criminal liability is a form of vicarious, collective liability that 
results in major consequences for all natural persons having interests in the 
corporation. However, the author wants to stress that despite the fact that this 
argument is underpinned with some truth there is still reason to punish the 
legal person; because, if a corporation is commencing illicit crimes through 
its employees with authorization from the directing mind, it is beyond 
reasonable doubt that the persons involved do not lack knowledge of the 
outcomes of their actions. Furthermore, if the crimes that are being 
commenced or have been commenced are of high blameworthiness and of a 
high notion, underpinned with facts of what the corporation is doing, persons 
having interests in the legal person should take appropriate measures to 
prevent and punish those persons that are commencing or have commenced 
these crimes. If such due diligence has been avoided, the shareholders or 
holders of interest should not have the possibility to avoid this form of 
collective responsibility; the corporation should be punished as a whole. 
Because, if not the whole corporation is punished, the corporation may 
continue with its commence, which is fully unacceptable, especially if the 
crimes committed constitute genocide. 
 
To further demonstrate corporate criminal liability, the author presents a 
recent case in which a legal person has been brought before the STL. The 
nature of the case does not involve aiding and abetting illicit crimes, but rather 
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contempt of court. As the case might seem irrelevant, the author wants to 
stress that it is of great value for discussion as it discusses the possibilities of 
prosecution of legal entities and the assessment thereof. 
 
5.1 Case of Al Akhbar, STL-14-06208 
In the establishment of corporate criminal liability, the Court decided to draw 
attention to the argumentation put forward by the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor 
who held that in order to impute corporate criminal liability on a corporation 
three requirements attributed to the corporation’s principals, employees, 
and/or affiliates must be satisfied; the identified person(s) must have “(1) 
acted within the scope of their employment; (2) had authority on behalf of the 
corporation; and (3) acted on behalf of the corporation.”209 The Defence 
stressed that such elements do not exist under international law and that the 
Amicus cannot derive them from national practices as there is no international 
consensus on the matter. Additionally, it was argued that this constitutes a 
breach of the principle nullum crimen sine lege because these elements did 
not exist during the time period prior to the corporate accused’s acts.210 
Contrary to the Defence, the Court found that these elements are envisaged in 
international law through the applicable Rule 60 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence,211 but acknowledged the lack of international 
conventions and international custom principles on this specific matter.212 
However, the Court found that there is an increasing number of nations that 
are criminalising unacceptable corporate behaviour but that the approach and 
penalty systems vary across nations, especially in cases where the acts of an 
                                                
208 Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. Ibrahim Mohamed Ali Al Amin, Case. No. STL-14-06/T/CJ, Trial 
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individual can be attributed to the corporation.213 Furthermore, the Court 
stressed that in order to see the differences in the assessment of corporate 
criminal liability across nations, there is a need to look beyond the systems of 
common law nations. By finding that the notion of corporate criminal liability 
is of such divergent nature in the international domain of domestic practices 
that there is a lack of consensus on it, the Court re-affirmed the Defence’s 
argument stating that the corporate accused not have been expected to know 
that its acts would result in a violation of international law.214 Thus, the Court 
found it reasonable to look into Lebanese Criminal Law under which 
corporations can be held liable and would in that sense not violate the rights 
of the accused.215 The Lebanese Criminal Code holds corporations liable for 
the acts committed by the directing mind,  representatives and other 
employees in the case that the crimes have been committed on behalf of the 
corporation.216 Moreover, in order to impose corporate criminal liability on a 
company, it is enough to identify the physical individual that has committed 
the crime.  
 
The Court held that the mens rea can only be fulfilled if the natural accused 
has knowingly and wilfully interfered with the administration of justice and 
that the act has been committed merely knowingly and wilfully in order to 
show culpability.217 The Court held that the Amicus had to prove that the 
accused “(1) deliberately published information on purported confidential 
witnesses, and (2) in doing so, they knew that their conduct was objectively 
likely to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal’s ability to protect the 
confidentiality of information about, provided by, witnesses or potential 
witnesses.” As regards knowledge and wilful blindness, the Court held that 
actual knowledge that the disclosure poses a threat to the public’s confidence 
in the Tribunals work can be inferred from various circumstances. Moreover, 
if only wilful blindness is established, that alone suffices knowledge which 
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gives reason to impute criminal liability. However, in order to establish wilful 
blindness, it must be established that “Accused had suspicion of the 
likelihood”, that he “must have wilfully kept himself unaware of facts that 
would confirm this likelihood, as so to be able to deny knowledge of it and 
therefore escape liability.”218 As regards corporate criminal liability, it can 
only be imputed on the corporation if it can be “(1) establish[ed that] the 
criminal responsibility of a specific natural person [exists]; (2) 
demonstrate[d] that, at the relevant time, such natural person was a director, 
member of the administration, representative (someone authorized by the 
legal person to act in its name) or an employee/worker (who must have been 
provided by the legal body with explicit authorization to act in its name) of 
the corporate Accused; and (3) prove[d] that the natural person’s criminal 
conduct was done either (a) on behalf of or (b) using the means of the 
corporate Accused.”219 
 
As the identified Editor-in-Chief, Mr Al Amin fulfilled all the required 
elements of both actus reus and mens rea, the Court found beyond reasonable 
doubt that he holds all requirements for prosecution.220 To this end, criminal 
responsibility of the directing mind has been established221 and found beyond 
reasonable doubt that Mr Al Amin fulfilled the qualifications required for the 
second element of corporate criminal liability.222 Also, the first required 
element was considered to be fulfilled beyond reasonable doubt as it was 
evident that the articles were issued by the corporate accused and that Mr Al 
Amin was using the means of the corporation and commenced the criminal 
conduct of on behalf of Al Akhbar.223 Therefore, the Court concluded that 
corporate criminal liability should be imputed on Al Akhbar.224 
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The author finds it interesting to note that the case of Al Akhbar is the first 
case in which corporate criminal liability has been imputed on a corporation 
which resulted in sentencing. Accordingly, Al Akhbar was sentenced to pay 
a fine of 6.000 Euros225 based on the Rule 60 bis (J).226 The rule implies that 
“(t)he maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in 
contempt of the Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven 
years, or a fine not exceeding 100.000 Euros, or both.”227 Reading the 
provision, the author wants to stress that she is of the belief that the fine that 
the Court has imposed on the company is ironically low considered the scope 
of the crime committed and the effects it has had on the victims and public, 
especially with regard to the ceiling of 100.000 Euros. The author is 
presenting her view due to her belief that such a low fine generally will not 
prevent a corporation from continuing with its commence that is breach of the 
law. Notably, Al Akhbar has before the publication of the two articles in the 
case at hand committed similar crimes228 as its main purpose seems to be to 
publish provoking materials that will catch the readers’ attention irrespective 
of the possible outcome that constitutes a crime in order to obtain self-
enrichment. As the provoking purpose seems to be the ideology of the 
corporate accused in order to obtain self-enrichment, the author wants to open 
up for discussion and ask if this low fine actually will make the corporate 
entity stop with its illicit commence?  
 
The Court stressed that the penalty should be based on the gravity of the 
commenced act taking a few indicators, such as aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, into account229 and that the principles used should be based 
on those applicable on natural persons.230 The author interprets the 
Sentencing Judgement as implying that the fine imposed on the natural person 
is enough of a punishment already, that it is to be seen as a mitigating 
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circumstance, and that the corporation thus should not be sentenced as harshly 
as it could be. Again, the author does not see this as a solution to the 
misbehaviour of the corporation and wants to hold the Court at fault for not 
imposing a higher fine.  
 
Despite negative reactions inherent to the thoughts of the author, the author 
wants to highlight the beauty of the Sentencing Judgement. As 
aforementioned, the Court could not rely on international standards with 
regards to corporate criminal liability as it held that such standards are non-
existent. However, despite the lack of opinion juris and common rules, the 
Court chose to rely on rules used domestically, which proves the author’s 
statement that international law has its roots in domestic law that lays the 
foundation to the continuously changing international criminal law.  
 
5.2 Coroprate Criminal Liability before the ICC: 
the Case of Land Grabbing in Cambodia 
As aforementioned, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over legal entities as 
such. However, the attempt of bringing corporations to trial lays in the wake 
of identifying the directing mind of corporate bodies involved and bringing 
him or her to trial, which might be perceived as the first step in introducing 
corporate criminal liability at the ICC. Previously, corporate directing minds 
have stood trial at the ICC for indirect co-perpetration for crimes against 
humanity as the directing mind used coded messages in his radio broadcasts 
to commit crimes such as murder and persecution.231 However, as the 
prosecution of the directing mind was in connection pursuant to a larger 
investigation, the Trial Chamber acquitted all charges brought against him232 
sic. Despite the overwhelming decision of the Trial Chamber, corporate 
directing minds will face prosecution if their actions consist of atrocity crimes 
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and are attributable to an overall situation that is pursuant to an investigation 
by the ICC.233 However, they might only be subjected to prosecution if the 
referred situation of investigation falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC; in 
the event that a corporate directing mind is operating in a state that is not a 
State Party or if its commence is not referred to the ICC by other qualified 
bodies, the corporation will not face prosecution and might well commit illicit 
crimes. Luckily, a safety well exists to this end; atrocity crimes committed by 
corporate bodies that are in complicity with the governmental conduct of such 
crimes with the aim of self-enrichment might well trigger prosecution at the 
ICC,234 which serves as a basis for the case of Land Grabbing in Cambodia. 
 
Since the collapse of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia a new Constitution arose 
protecting the right to private ownership of property.235 Despite the 
constitutional change, land grabbing has continued to be a major issue in 
Cambodia as a lot of land has been granted to corporations as a form of 
enterprise in which approximately half a million Cambodians have been 
affected by suffered fear and pain in various ways and have had their lives 
and livelihoods aggravated.236 In October 2014, a communication237 was filed 
to the ICC against the Cambodian ruling elites together with corporate 
directing minds who allegedly have been systematically carrying out attacks 
against the civilian population238 in order to achieve self-enrichment 
stemming from land grabbing.239 These attacks are seen as grave human rights 
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violations240 that amount to crimes against humanity241 and thereof, fall 
within the scope of Article 7 of the Rome Statute.242 Notably, the case of Land 
Grabbing in Cambodia satisfies all requisites for crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute. 
 
However, the question how the ICC will deal with all the actors involved as 
accomplices is unclear. The author believes that the Court may examine each 
and every individual separately or possibly regard them as belonging to a 
conspiracy imposing liability thereof.  Either way, directors or the directing 
minds of corporations may be subjected to liability for doing everything in 
their power to achieve self-enrichment for the cost of the wellbeing of 
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numerous civilians. If this will be the outcome, this case may serve as a safety 
valve for future convictions of corporate directing minds.  
 
5.3 A Question of Jurisdiction 
As aforementioned, atrocity crimes are international crimes recognised as jus 
cogens norms calling for international jurisdiction.243 However, as only the 
STL has explicit jurisdiction over legal entities, international criminal law and 
other international courts and tribunals might be perceived as giving room for 
corporations to commit jus cogens crimes. This is a misinterpretation as the 
absence of jurisdiction does not alleviate the corporate international legal 
obligations244 nor does it mean that for instance, ICJ lacks jurisdiction in ditto 
cases or that the Statutes of the existing tribunals cannot be broadened to 
include legal entities as subjects for prosecution.245 Taking genocide as 
example, the Genocide Convention provides for domestic246 or international 
prosecution if an international court or tribunal prohibits the act in its 
Statute247 and leaves the question of interpretation to the ICJ.248 Despite these 
provisions, legal entities cannot be brought before the ICC, ICTY, ICTR or 
the ECCC as they only have jurisdiction over natural persons. This does 
however not dismiss the existence of will among international actors, such as 
advocates, prosecutors and judges, to prosecute legal entities.  
 
ICC’s first Chief-Prosecutor held that corporations should be subjected to 
international criminal law before international courts and tribunals249 but was 
consequently overheard. Interestingly, the preparatory works stated that 
prosecution of legal entities should be enabled “with the exception of States, 
                                                
243 See para XX of the thesis 
244 Clapham, 2006, p. 31. 
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Abuses’, 33 Brooklyn Journal on International Law (2008), p. 903. 
246 Article 5 of the Genocide Convention; Abtahi, H. and Webb, F., The Genocide 
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when the crimes were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their 
agents of representatives.”250 Because, “[a]t no point during the drafting of 
the Rome Statute was it claimed by any delegation that the ‘legal person’ 
referred to in the draft could not demonstrate the requisite legal capacity to be 
bearers of international obligations.”251 Unfortunately, the actual reason why 
the Rome Statute does not contain this provision today is because of the time 
limit to create the statute and not because of the lack of will among the 
international actors who played a significant role in the preparatory works.252 
Thus, the Rome Statute only admit jurisdiction over physical persons.253  
 
Despite the underlying inconvenience that resulted in the narrow jurisdiction 
of the ICC, the problem of exclusion of legal entities can be overcome. Of 
course, the task is not easy as it requires legal incentive and political cover by 
the ICC State Parties; without such motivation, a change of the Rome Statute 
to include legal entities might be hard to achieve. However, as globalisation 
is developing, the view of corporate criminal liability within domestic 
practices is changing to be more and more acceptable,254 which might induce 
a change of the Rome Statute. A change of the Rome Statute does not strictly 
need to be all-embracing; only single Articles might be amended. Sheffer 
suggests that Article 25(1) may read “The Court shall have jurisdiction over 
natural and juridical persons pursuant to this Statute” and that Article 1 can 
embrace jurisdiction over legal persons if it may read “It shall be a permanent 
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over natural 
and juridical persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as 
referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions. Any use of ‘person’ or ‘persons’ or the ‘accused’ in this Statute 
shall mean a natural or juridical person unless the text connotes an exclusive 
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usage.”255 If two-thirds of the State Parties approves such amendments and if 
the amendments are acknowledged by seven-eighths of the State Parties,256 
corporate criminal liability within international criminal law will be fully 
established. 
 
On the other hand and in the event that the State Parties do not agree on 
amending the Rome Statute, there actually exist a possibility to turn to the 
ICJ, as stated above. It is true that the ICJ does not hear criminal cases 
concerning individuals as it only has jurisdiction to solve disputes among 
states.257 Nevertheless, there is nothing banning the ICJ from giving advisory 
opinions to organs of the UN.258 Therefore, the UN Security Council, that is 
an authorised body by the UN, may, on behalf of the ICC, request an advisory 
opinion on the matter of expanding its jurisdiction from the ICJ. If the ICJ 
gives its opinion in the affirmative, there would have to be a change of the 
Rome Statute to include jurisdiction over legal entities as it has been 
discussed in the preparatory works; notably, this will only be the case in the 
event that the majority of signatory states agree on the opinion of the ICJ.  
 
Another solution would be that the Security Council creates a new ad hoc 
Tribunal alike the ICTY and ICTR to only deal with cases of corporate 
security force nature. However, this solution is not the most adequate as the 
tribunal perhaps would not be able to prosecute corporations that have 
commenced illicit acts that are not of security force nature. Thus, the author 
would like to suggest the establishment of a treaty-based multilateral tribunal 
on illicit acts adjudicating criminal complaints against corporate bodies. This 
approach is seemingly time comprising and depends highly on the will of 
states. However, if there is a will among states that are and are not State 
Parties to the Rome Statute, this might be the most effective solution to hold 
corporate entities liable for the commence of illicit acts. In the event that 
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states do not have a will to create such a tribunal, a final solution to be 
mentioned is perhaps to engage human rights activists and NGOs to actively 
advocate on the importance of the existence of an international convention 
prescribing illicit corporate behaviour, as it was done in the achievement of 
the Convention on Landmines.259  
 
5.4 Potential Sentencing Measures 
The opportunity to achieve justice today is much alike the opportunity 
discussed during the trials of war criminals sic.260 There exists a good and, 
nevertheless, a strong case before the ICC dealing with crimes against 
humanity in which corporations have been complicit to. Now, assume that the 
ICC gains jurisdiction over legal entities and that the ICC rules in their 
disadvantage, but ambiguous remains the question of what the sentence 
should consist of? Guidelines are almost non-existent if the ICC soughs for 
an answer in international criminal law and practices by international criminal 
tribunals as only one court has dealt with prosecution of corporations, namely 
the STL, that speculation-wise did not know how to rightfully address the 
issue of the financial amount of the penalty. Perhaps the Court was unwilling 
or felt uncomfortable to seek guidance in other jurisdictions on the matter? 
Perhaps the Court was afraid to impose a higher fine in order to avoid 
criticism by major corporate actors? Either the way and from a human rights 
perspective, this signals that corporations have major power and that they 
stand above the law.  
 
In the light of the global economy, corporations have grown big pursuing 
trade with a high margin of financial gain of which shareholders benefit 
from.261 Additionally, if a corporation is gaining power and finances by being 
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in accomplice to the commence of illicit crimes, it should, accordingly, be 
punished with such high fines that the core of international criminal law is not 
undermined; because, with rights come responsibility. These shareholders or 
owners must take appropriate due diligence measures to assure that the legal 
entity cannot and will not commence crimes prescribed in international law. 
For their realisation of the gravity of their commence, a high set of standards 
with regards to sentences need to be established. If this is not established, 
generally low fines will undermine the core of criminal law and more or less 
encourage the corporate body to continue with its illegal commence. As have 
seen in the case of Al Akhbar, the company has committed similar crimes and 
does not seem to have guilt for its actions, which indicates that it might 
continue in the same manner due to its aim of profiting, regardless of what its 
acts might result in. Therefore, the author wants to hold the STL at fault for 
committing a major mistake in a case that might serve as a landmark case for 
future convictions. Furthermore, a new question has arisen: what is an 
appropriate sanction to be imposed on a corporate body for being complicit 
in crimes prescribed in the Rome Statute?  
 
5.4.1 Sanctions for Legal Persons 
Below is presented an Article that can be directly inserted in the Rome Statute 
or any other Statute of the existing international tribunals, followed by a 
commentary with the opinion of the author. As the placement of the Article 
might vary depending on the statute concerned, the author has decided to 
name it Article X. Additionally and for the sake of clarity, instead of referring 
to Articles regarding grave crimes specifically in the presented Article X, the 
author will refer to them as Articles Y Due to the same reason of difference in 
placement. Note that Articles stand for multiple articles despite the common 
denominator Y. 
 
Article X 
The Court shall take necessary measures to guarantee that a legal person 
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held liable pursuant to Articles Y is punishable by effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive sanctions, which may include fines, exclusion from entitlement 
to public benefits or aid, temporary or permanent disqualification from the 
relevant practice of commercial activities or placing under judicial 
supervision. 
Temporary or permanent disqualification might seem harsh and controversial 
with regard to the global economy, but should be understood and applied as 
a preventive measure; if a corporation has directly assisted in the commence 
of a crime, temporal disqualification from the relevant market should apply - 
if a corporation has commenced crimes directly, permanent disqualification 
from the relevant market should be applied. Generally, judicial supervision is 
characterised of both administrative actions and of measures of administrative 
supervision. The aim of this provision is to “undo” the caused harm and 
provide compensation to the affected/survived victims and family members 
of the victims that have not survived. In other words, this is a financial 
security valve serving to compensate the life losses. The exact amount of 
compensation is not included as Article X states that every conviction should 
be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The author leaves this matter to 
the Court. As regards the term family members, the author leaves it to the 
Court to decide what that involves.   
The aim of this section is to provide a framework of sanctions that are 
to be imposed on legal entities by an international court or tribunal. 
The author is aware that some questions with regards to the 
terminology are unanswered but because of lack of space in this thesis, 
the author has decided to leave them open to the Court to decide. 
Hypothetically, if the Court itself decides on the scope of the terminology 
through interpretation and influences from other cases, concise case law will 
be created and the questions will be solved. The author is aware of the 
forthcoming question in lieu of this: how and by whom will these sentences 
be executed? The author leaves this question to be answered by other scholars 
as it falls outside the scope of the thesis. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of the thesis is to show how domestic practices have affected the 
international domain with regards to prosecution of individual and group 
perpetrators that have committed atrocity crimes in order to show that 
domestic practices on corporate criminal liability is affecting the international 
domain to apply the same prosecuting standards in relation to corporations. 
Id est, the author seeks to illustrate that there might be room for a greater 
scope for corporate criminal liability in international criminal law, based on 
the historical development of international criminal law. Furthermore, as the 
author does not only want to stress the impact of domestic practices on 
international criminal law, she takes a step beyond the overall impact of 
domestic practices and provides with possible solutions on how the ICC and 
ad hoc Tribunals might widen the scope of their statutes in order to satisfy the 
will among international judicial actors to be able to hold corporations 
accountable for the wrongdoings of their directing minds and employees. 
Thus, an Article with possible sanctions is introduced as a proposal to the 
international domain of criminal law, as that is what it lacks. 
 
The research question reads Is there room for international criminal liability 
in international criminal law? has been answered through examination of 
three overall themes formulated as questions; (1) How has domestic law 
affected international criminal law?, (2) To what extent can corporations be 
held liable internationally?, (3) If a corporation brought before an 
international court or tribunal is prosecuted for complicity of some sort, what 
are the feasible measures that can be taken against them and why? 
 
As noted throughout the thesis, command responsibility of individuals that 
have committed atrocity crimes has emerged from domestic practices and is 
rooted in the notion of vicarious strict liability deriving from the context of 
the domestic context at the time of the formation of international individual 
responsibility. As context and society change, the notion of superior or 
command responsibility develops to explicitly be imputed on the individual 
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culprit. Subsequently, command liability developed by giving rise to another 
form of criminal liability; namely, JCE liability that holds groups or entities 
of persons liable as this form of liability is a fair strike against all persons 
involved who jointly act with a common plan and aim to achieve something 
that is morally unacceptable. The actus reus and mens rea of both forms of 
liability have been addressed to illuminate how they are imposed on 
individuals and entities respectively in domestic cases in which corporate 
criminal liability has been imputed on corporate bodies. Should individuals 
that operate as group or an entity be held liable jointly for the acts committed, 
then why should an organisation be disregarded in terms of liability for the 
commence of international crimes committed in the name of the corporation? 
 
After an evaluation of domestic practices, it has been shown that it is a trend 
among most states to prosecute corporations and in doing so, the states most 
often refer to two forms of theories that serve as a basis for command 
responsibility and JCE liability; namely, vicarious liability and the theory of 
alter ego. The application of these theories vary among states; however, great 
similarities exist within the application of both. As regards the theory of 
vicarious liability, this form of liability is not to be preferred as it aims at 
punishing a physical person, much alike command liability, which gave 
reason to examine the theory of alter ego. In difference from vicarious 
liability, the theory of alter ego aims at holding the corporate body liable per 
se as it makes an analogous interpretation of natural person in criminal law in 
order to explain the notion of what a legal person is; the persons acting in the 
name of the corporation constitute its mind and limbs, alike a JCE in which 
the persons involved constitute the brains and limbs for the function of the 
entity as such.  
 
Generally, prosecution of corporate entities for breaches of international 
criminal law is fully possible on the domestic level which, moreover, has 
generated the creation of international instruments on state practices on how 
to best prosecute corporate entities domestically. In the light of the 
development of international instruments on state practices, it is possible to 
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stress that the international domain urges the importance of such liability, 
which might serve as legal basis for the foundation of international 
prosecution. Previously, corporate criminal liability has been touched upon 
internationally and referred to during the trials of war criminals. However 
only directors of corporations have been held liable for the commence of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity during WWII despite the fact that the 
Nuremberg Charter provided for prosecution of corporate bodies. Conversely, 
the STL found that corporate criminal liability is of high importance and 
decided to advocate for the notion through prosecution of a corporate body. 
Not being able to rely on international standards, the Court sought guidance 
in domestic practices. Highly dependent on domestic practices, the STL 
established the actus reus and mens rea of corporate entities and found a 
corporate body criminally liable for contempt of court. Arguably, references 
made to the case-law of this Court might seem misleading as the corporate 
body did not commit atrocity crimes. However, this case has been carefully 
chosen to stress that domestic practices lay the necessary foundation for the 
development of international criminal law to include corporate criminal 
liability. 
 
As regards the ICC and other international tribunals, their statutes explicitly 
limit their jurisdiction to natural persons. However, prior to the findings 
presented, the ICC has for the first time received a communication in which, 
among the ruling elites, corporations have been in complicity to crimes 
against humanity. As the case is of classified nature, only speculations can be 
made on the outcomes. The author has presented her views stressing that the 
Court might not prosecute the legal entities per se but rather the directing 
minds of the corporate body involved through command responsibility or 
conspiracy (JCE) liability. Certainly, the first approach may be perceived as 
a form of imposition in the form of corporate criminal liability that falls under 
the theory of vicarious liability to be imposed on the directing mind 
representing the corporate body. The second aspect might entail all corporate 
shareholders that have not taken due diligence measures. Markedly, this may 
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be the first step towards expanding the scope of the Rome Statute allowing 
the court to have jurisdiction over legal entities.  
 
Moreover, and contingent upon that the ICC would find that prosecution of 
corporate entities per se should be commenced, the UN Security Council may 
request an advisory opinion on the matter of expanding ICC’s jurisdiction 
from the ICJ if the signatory states are unwilling to allow for expansion of it.  
If the ICJ finds that expansion of the Rome Statute occurs as appropriate, the 
ICC would have the freedom to sentence corporate bodies for the crimes 
committed as the Member States are expected to follow the advice. The author 
notes that this argumentation might seem farfetched; however, it is not 
precluded to be the case, especially if the preparations of the Rome Statute 
and suggestions on changes from renowned scholars are born in mind. To 
conclude the argumentation vis-à-vis the ICC and its Statute, the position on 
the subject of corporate criminal liability remains unclear as there is no case 
or judgement to rely on. However, the author wants to stress once again that 
the ICC has already taken a step towards incorporation of practices with 
regards to corporate criminal liability as it has a case on its table regarding 
corporations that have been in complicity to crimes against humanity, and by 
sentencing the directing minds, corporate criminal liability, in form of 
vicarious liability or other natural persons forming a conspiracy group, will 
be achieved. With this said, corporations may be held liable before the ICC 
even if it is not to that degree that the author aims at. 
 
Another solution involves the creation of a new ad hoc Tribunal only hear 
cases of corporate security force nature. However, this might not be an 
adequate solution due to its limited character. Suggestion-wise, the 
establishment of a treaty-based multilateral tribunal on illicit acts adjudicating 
criminal complaints against corporate bodies is sufficient despite its time 
comprising nature. A solution of last resort is perhaps to engage human rights 
activists and NGOs to actively advocate on the importance of the existence 
of an international convention prescribing illicit corporate behaviour, as it 
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was done in the achievement of the Convention on Landmines in order to 
achieve a greater good for all in the name of human rights. 
 
As has been provided above, there exists a legal framework that holds 
corporate entities liable for the commence of illicit crimes even though 
explicit provisions on the matter are lacking. If a legal person is gaining power 
and enrichment through acts of accomplice to the commence of illicit crimes, 
it should, accordingly, be punished; because, with rights come responsibility. 
For this, a high set of standards with regards to sentences needs to be 
established. Thus, the author has composed an Article with possible 
sentencing measures - with the aim not to restrict state sovereignty, the global 
economy or to abolish certain actors from the financial market but to rather 
assure transparency for legal entities to know the consequences in the event 
that they contribute to grievous harm such as mass killings of civilians - that 
she believes will serve as the ultimate guideline for Courts and Tribunals in 
the event that corporate criminal liability becomes explicitly recognized as a 
form of liability in international criminal law. This Article is based on what 
the author believes is the rightest solution in order to achieve justice for the 
greater good and should by no means be seen in the light of negativity. Aware 
is the author of the leading question regarding the execution of the penalty; 
however, as it falls outside the scope of the thesis, the author has chosen not 
to discuss it but rather leave it to the international Courts, Tribunals and other 
researchers for clarification. 
 
In brevitis, despite the lack of legal framework among the majority of 
international Courts and Tribunals, corporate criminal liability is becoming 
more acceptable as a form of liability in international criminal law. Domestic 
law serves as legal basis for interpretation and application of criminal law 
when grave crimes have been commenced by corporate bodies and provide 
the courts with concise examples on how it is best applied in practice. 
Accordingly, justice demands to hold legal entities liable for the commence 
of illicit acts regardless of the gravity of involvement; therefore, it is time for 
international criminal law to develop to the better. To answer the research 
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question, domestic practices, internationally recognised theories and recent 
case law from STL provide the tools on how to best approach the question of 
how a corporate body can best be prosecuted despite the current lack of an 
explicit legal framework in international criminal law. In other words, there 
is room for corporate criminal liability in international criminal law. 
However, if it will be achieved is a matter of future developments. 
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